The difference between the measurement bases of classical and quantum mechanics is often interpreted as a loss of reality arising in quantum mechanics. In this paper it is shown that this apparent loss occurs only if one believes that refined everyday experience determines the Euclidean space as the real space, instead of considering this space, both in classical and quantum mechanics, as a theoretical construction needed for measurement and representing one part of a dualistic space conception. From this point of (...) view, Einstein's program of a unified field theory can be interpreted as the attempt to find a physical theory that is less dualistic. However, if one rgards this dualism as resulting from the requirements of measurements, one can hope for a weakening of the dualism but not expect to remove it completely. (shrink)

The Received View of particles in quantum mechanics is that they are indistinguishable entities within their kinds and that, as a consequence, they are not individuals in the metaphysical sense and self-identity does not meaningfully apply to them. Nevertheless cardinality does apply, in that one can have n> 1 such particles. A number of authors have recently argued that this cluster of claims is internally contradictory: roughly, that having more than one such particle requires that the concepts of distinctness and (...) identity must apply after all. A common thread here is that the notion of identity is too fundamental to forego in any metaphysical account. I argue that this argument fails. I then argue that the failure of individuality and identity applies also to macroscopic physical objects, that the problems cannot be constrained to apply only within the microscopic realm. (shrink)