Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Phenomenology as Proto-Computationalism: Do the Prolegomena Indicate a Computational Reading of the Logical Investigations?Jesse D. Lopes - 2023 - Husserl Studies 39 (1):47-68.
    This essay examines the possibility that phenomenological laws might be implemented by a computational mechanism by carefully analyzing key passages from the Prolegomena to Pure Logic. Part I examines the famous Denkmaschine passage as evidence for the view that intuitions of evidence are causally produced by computational means. Part II connects the less famous criticism of Avenarius & Mach on thought-economy with Husserl's 1891 essay 'On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic).' Husserl is shown to reaffirm his earlier opposition to associationist (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Pluralist neurophenomenology: a reply to Lopes.Jeff Yoshimi - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-24.
    Lopes ( 2021 ) has argued against my use of neural networks and dynamical systems theory in neurophenomenology. Responding to his argument provides an opportunity to articulate a pluralist approach to neurophenomenology, according to which multiple theoretical frameworks—symbolic, dynamical systems, connectionist, etc.—can be used to study consciousness and its relationship to neural activity. Each type of analysis is best suited to specific phenomena, but they are mutually compatible and can inform and constrain one another in non-trivial ways. I use historical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Naturalization without associationist reduction: a brief rebuttal to Yoshimi.Jesse Lopes - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-9.
    Yoshimi has attempted to defuse my argument concerning the identification of network abstraction with empiricist abstraction - thus entailing psychologism - by claiming that the argument does not generalize from the example of simple feed-forward networks. I show that the particular details of networks are logically irrelevant to the nature of the abstractive process they employ. This is ultimately because deep artificial neural networks (ANNs) and dynamical systems theory applied to the mind (DST) are both associationisms - that is, empiricist (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark