Wellman identified three types of conductive arguments, the third of which contains both pro and counter-considerations in the same piece of reasoning. This paper provides a pragma-dialectical analysis of this type of argumentation, with special focus on argumentation reconstruction. It argues that the account of pro/con argumentation in the framework of argument-as-product has problems solvable by a pragma-dialectical approach. The paper asserts that pro/con argumentation should be analyzed as a dialectical strategy of a protagonist, where acknowledgement of counter-considerations shows that (...) the antagonist’s reasons have been taken into consideration, although the pro-considerations override them. Thus, the pro-considerations of pro/con argumentation should be interpreted as the protagonist’s overriding defeaters of the antagonist’s counter-arguments, the protagonist incorporating the latter as counter-considerations. The paper further argues that the pragma-dialectical framework needs an additional conceptual tool to properly reconstruct complex forms of pro/con argumentation. Finally, the pragma-dialectical approach to reconstruct pro/con argumentation has several advantages, especially to a more logical-structural approach to complex pro/con argumentation. (shrink)

Pascal Engel distingue globalement deux tendances de concevoir la vérité : les uns défendent une théorie substantialiste selon laquelle la vérité exprime une « caractéristique réelle », les autres, déflationnistes, soutiennent que la vérité n’est pas une propriété authentique des porteurs de vérités. Prenant le réalisme comme option par défaut, Engel cherche une position médiane stable, telle que la vérité est un concept plus substantiel que le déflationnisme ne le prétend et moins substantiel que les théories réalistes ne disent qu’elle (...) est. Dans cet article on développe une solution médiane alternative à la position proposée par Engel en se basant sur une option anti-réaliste et pragmatique (mais non utilitariste). On montre, plus exactement, dans quelle mesure la conception dialogique de la vérité, avancée par Kuno Lorenz, s’oppose aux thèses défendues par Engel tout en poursuivant le même but que lui. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to answer the following question: Does it make sense to speak of thought experiments not only in physics, but also in mathematics, to refer to an authentic type of activity? One may hesitate because mathematics as such is the exercise of reasoning par excellence, an activity where experience does not seem to play an important role. After reviewing some results of the research on thought experiments in the natural sciences, we turn our attention to (...) experiments and thought experiments in mathematics, especially in fundamental mathematics, and investigate what thought experiments can teach us there. If we accept the principle that mathematical practice can sometimes be best described by a pragmatist approach where the concept of experience in mathematics is considered from a new perspective, thought experiments can in some cases be a useful instrument different from both ‘mathematical experiments’ and ‘formal’ proofs: they are mathematical experiments using deviant methods. (shrink)