The popular belief that our mind either depends on or (in stronger terms) is identical with brain functions and processes, along with the belief that advances in technology in virtual reality and computability will continue, has contributed to the contention that one-day (perhaps this century) it may be possible to transfer one’s mind (or a simulated copy) into another body (physical or virtual). This is called mind-uploading or whole brain emulation. This paper serves as an introduction to the area and (...) some of the major issues that arise from the notion of mind-uploading. The topic of mind/brain uploading is, at present, both a philosophical and scientific minefield. This paper ties together several thoughts on the topic in the popular, philosophical, and scientific literature, and brings up some related issues that might be worth exploring. A challenge is made that uploading a mind from a brain may have intrinsic limitations on what can be uploaded: whatever is uploaded may not be recognizably human, or will be a very limited version. (shrink)

Sergius Bulgakov (1871–1944) was one of the centrally important Russian Orthodox theologians of the past century. His theological system (Sophiology) is among the most detailed and comprehensive attempts at a novel, Orthodox systematic theology developed in engagement with western philosophical and theological movements. His first major work of theology, Unfading Light (1917), incorporates an early Orthodox critique of the radical Christian transhumanism propounded by Nikolai Fedorovich Fedorov (1829–1903). Fedorov had developed an account of humanity's prospects for a technologically facilitated eschatology. (...) The goals of this article are: (1) to provide a concise summary Fedorov's ideas on technologized resurrection; (2) to provide an overview of Bulgakov's sympathetic critique of Fedorov's model; and (3) to discuss the ongoing relevance of that critique vis‐à‐vis current and future Christian dialogue with the transhumanist movement. (shrink)

This piece brings into critical conversation Christian resurrection hope, virtual versions of transhumanism, and intellectual disability and demonstrates that Christian resurrection provides a more cogent hope for people with severe intellectual disabilities than transhumanism. I argue that transhumanist virtual futures are theologically problematic, as bodily resurrection is neither required nor desirable. It is particularly problematic for people with severe intellectual disabilities given the way they would be excluded from these futures. Disability theology also raises issues with the traditional notions of (...) “healing” in the resurrection and the implications for the value and identity of persons with intellectual disabilities. Starting with these problems, I explore the nature of Christian hope, noting the inadequacies of a virtual transhumanist future with respect to both resurrection faith and intellectual disability, and address how resurrection hope can account for issues raised in disability theology, and so properly include people with intellectual disabilities. (shrink)