The relatively late acceptance of Darwinism in German biology and paleontology is frequently attributed to a lingering of Lamarckism, a persisting influence of German idealistic Naturphilosophie and Goethean romanticism. These factors are largely held responsible for the vitalism underlying theories of saltational and orthogenetic evolutionary change that characterize the writings of many German paleontologists during the first half of the 20th century. A prominent exponent of that tradition was Karl Beurlen, who is credited with having been the first German paleontologist (...) to present a full-fledged theory of saltational evolution and orthogenetic change. A review of Beurlen's writings reveals motives and concerns far more complex, however, and firmly rooted in contemporary völkisch thought and Aryan Science. Beurlen's mature theory of evolution can indeed be understood as his own contribution to Aryan Geology and Biology, tainted as it was with National-Socialist ideology. Evolutionary biologists of the time who opposed the theories of Beurlen and likeminded authors, i.e., idealistic morphology, typology, saltational change, orthogenesis and cyclism did so on Darwinian principles, which ultimately prevailed. But at the time when the battle was fought, their adherence to the principle of natural selection was likewise ideologically tainted, namely in terms of racial theory. National-Socialist ideology was unable to forge a unity of evolutionary theory in Germany even amongst those of its proponents who endorsed this ideology. (shrink)

Nietzsche was a philosopher, not a biologist, Nevertheless his philosophical thought was deeply influenced by ideas emerging from the evolutionary biology of the nineteenth century. His relationship to the Darwinism of his time is difficult to disentangle. It is argued that he was in a sense an unwitting Darwinist. It follows that his philosophical thought is of considerable interest to those concerned to develop an evolutionary biology of mankind. His approach can be likened to that of an extraterrestrial sociobiologist studying (...) clever beasts... in some out of the way corner of the universe ... It is shown how be uses this viewpoint to account for the origin of the central psychobiology of humankind: for dualistic philosophies, such as that of Descartes (which Ryle famously called the official doctrine), for human notions of truth and falsehood, being and becoming, and for other fundamental concepts of Western philosophy and science. All these, he argues, are no more and no less than the necessary adaptations of a zoological species, Homo sapiens, in its struggle for life in a Darwinian world. It is concluded that Nietzsche was the first philosopher to accept and use in their full depth the philosophical implications of nineteeth-century evolutionism, implications which are still resisted to this day. It is also argued that this interpretation of Nietzsche's aphoristic writings provides them with an organic consistency. (shrink)

For Schopenhauer, death, understood as the annihilation of an individual's existence, cannot be successfully accommodated by theories endorsing an optimistic assessment of both human life and the world at large. I argue that Schopenhauer also has reasons to think that optimism cannot adopt personal immortality as a solution to that problem, although he does not present them systematically. Thus, he argues, prolonging one's life would necessarily lead at some point to an unbearable state of exhaustion due to one's unchanging character. (...) Changing one's character infinitely many times in the future would not do either, as Schopenhauer regards that idea as internally inconsistent. Finally, the immortality gained through one's work, one's descendants, or the survival of a part of oneself, while consistent with optimism, could not amount to personal immortality, on Schopenhauer's criteria. I end by discussing the implications of Schopenhauer's criticism for his own view, and a possible reply to it. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como propósito poner de relieve el contraste trágico entre la afirmación de una teleología natural y la ausencia de teleología moral en el pensamiento de Schopenhauer. Se comprenderá su gesto filosófico como el vaciamiento de la finalidad. Concretamente, se examinará cómo el absurdo que tiene lugar en virtud del contraste mencionado, sumado a la concepción de vida que late en el proyecto schopenhaueriano, conduce a una consideración necesariamente irracionalista y pesimista de la existencia. Desde la perspectiva (...) del autor, ante la ausencia de una finalidad racional del mundo no existe otra vía más que el pesimismo. En esta dirección, quisiera centrarme en una de las consecuencias más profundas de las premisas mencionadas (a saber, la carencia de finalidad final, apariencia de ajuste teleológico, pesimismo, irracionalidad, concepción de vida, etc). Me refiero a la imposibilidad de la historia y, con ella, a la imposibilidad de cualquier clase de cambio o transformación. Por último, intentaré despejar dos posibles suspicacias en relación con la irracionalidad y ausencia de fin final en la filosofía de Schopenhauer. (shrink)

This article presents a reconstruction of the so-called classical, formal or Mendelian genetics, which is intended to be more complete and adequate than existing reconstructions. This reconstruction has been carried out with the instruments, duly modified and extended with respect to the case under consideration, of the structuralist conception of theories. The so-called Mendel’s Laws, as well as linkage genetics and gene mapping are formulated in a precise manner while the global structure of genetics is represented as a theory-net. These (...) results are of methodological, philosophical and didactical relevance. (shrink)

Este trabajo constituye una primera aproximación a la teoría del origen en común tal como aparece en On the Origin of Species, de Charles Darwin. Luego de exponer las diferencias entre esta teoría y la teoría de la selección natural y la teoría de la evolución, se presentan algunos debates en torno a la determinación de homologías, el vocabulario de la teoría y su ley fundamental. Finalmente, se discute la TOC-teoricidad de los términos involucrados y los candidatos a especializaciones de (...) TOC. (shrink)

The idea of the élan vital is crucial for an understanding of Bergson’s metaphysical method, underpinning the way in which philosophy stands with other forms of creative activity as an endeavour of “self-overcoming,” the self or subject no longer being at the centre of thought, but understood rather as a product of the process of thinking. In placing a special emphasis on Bergson’s 1907 work, Creative Evolution, the present essay is both an acknowledgement and challenge to the shift from early (...) interpretations of Bergson in which comparisons were made with thinkers such as Schelling and Schopenhauer, to more recent engagements centred on the theories of perception and memory. The aim of this essay is to formulate a response to the marginalized status of Creative Evolution in the “perception-based” strands of Bergson scholarship, by emphasising how Bergson’s theories of memory and consciousness are a means for understanding his definition of evolutionary “creativity.” Bergson suggests that the analysis of consciousness or “will” can provide us with a way of thinking about this creative movement of life, which is not a concept of a “cause” or “origin” in the sense of a “state of nature” (substance, essence, or “being”), but rather the operation of pure tendency. (shrink)

This thesis involves a rigorous examination of Henri Bergson's concept of community. I argue that the problem of the individual in society, first as an integral part of a static, closed society and then as a spiritually evolved participant in the dynamic, open society, is the essential topic of Bergson's The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. In the Two Sources Bergson offered a vision of what he called the "open society"--a global community of all mankind founded and sustained by (...) mystical love. Bergson argued for the establishment of the open society as the necessary resolution of the inter-societal tension which threatens the survival of mankind. ;Chapter One is expository in nature with an introductory section presenting an overview of the content and methodology of Bergson's philosophy. Emphasis is placed upon the key concepts of: change, duration, intuition and the elan vital. ;Since the emotions play an integral part in Bergson's analysis of the higher expressions of man in community, and represent the means of individual creative change, Chapter Two will examine them in detail. Particular attention will be paid to love--for Bergson the greatest of the emotions and the one he hoped would bring about the open society. ;Chapter Three deals with Bergson's two types of community. Closed societies represent a static, biological halt in mankind's evolutionary development. Bergson described them as exclusionary in nature and deriving their cohesion from two powerful sources: nature's biological demand for group unity and their cohesive response to perceived outside threats. Their successor, the Open Society, whose essence is creative change, is ultimately undefinable. Spiritual in character, it is perhaps best understood as an aggregation of highly developed, "aspirational" persons; each existing as a "species" unto him/her self. ;Bergson believed that it is only by means of the spiritual love generated by "complete," socially active mystics that the arresting powers of closed societies can be overcome. Thus, in Chapter Four, the final task of the dissertation will be to critique Bergson's understanding of the nature and role of mysticism and its suitability for the purpose he assigns it. (shrink)

El objetivo de mi trabajo estriba en reconocer sucintamente algunos de los puntos principales en que se fundamenta la posición de Nietzsche en relación a la teleología natural. El modo de atajar la cuestión será, en esta oportunidad, oponer la visión de Nietzsche al estado en que dejó Schopenhauer la cuestión. Para ello, abordaré en primer lugar algunos de los elementos que emparentan ambos proyectos y, en segundo lugar, un aspecto clave que parece alejarlos irremediablemente. Además de esclarecer este último (...) aspecto, intentaré un acercamiento a la especificidad y originalidad del proyecto nietzscheano sobre el tema. (shrink)