Roughly 80,000 U.S. prisoners are held in solitary confinement at any given time. A significant body of research shows that solitary confinement has severe, long-term effects, and the United Nations has condemned the practice of solitary confinement as torture. For years, prisoners have been organizing hunger strikes in order to protest solitary confinement. But such action is not without consequences, and some inmates have suffered serious injury or death. The question I raise in this paper is whether we ought to (...) force-feed hunger striking prisoners when serious harm is imminent. Both the World Medical Association and the American Medical Association have denounced the practice of force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike, and yet, the practice is common. Such prevalence is likely a result of the tension between the person-as-patient and person-as-prisoner and cannot easily be resolved. Instead, we must take seriously the complaint that solitary confinement is inhumane and avoid placing health professionals in the position where they must choose to force-feed the prisoner against his will or not. I argue that a conventional bioethics debate centering on polarizing principles of prisoner autonomy and a duty-to-protect the prisoner from harm is an inadequate framework for this complex issue. Instead, we must examine the prisoner’s intent and his right to freedom of speech. I argue that when the prisoner’s intent is to raise awareness and communicate with others, his hunger strike is a form of speech. Protest-as-speech is constitutionally protected—even for prisoners—and remains a minimum ethical obligation for society to uphold. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:In this article I inquire into Confucian ethics from a non-ideal stance investigating the complex interaction between Confucian ideals and the reality of the modern workplace. I contend that even Confucian workers who regularly engage in social rites at the workplace have an internal, Confucian reason to appreciate the value of rights at the workplace. I explain, from a Confucian non-ideal perspective, why I disagree with the presumptuous idea that labor (or workplace) rights are necessarily incompatible with Confucian ideals and (...) values. Specifically, I argue that if managers were “sages,” the highest moral exemplars and authorities in the Confucian tradition, they would perceive that social rituals alone are often not a contextually intelligent and valued response for the development of intimate communities in the modern workplace. The sage perspective will lead Confucian managers to realize, from their own moral perspective, that they have good reason to balance rites with rights, so long as the adoption is extrinsically valuable and consistent with the Confucian ideal. This article contributes to the debates about Confucianism's compatibility with rights, helps Western human rights scholars better contextualize their arguments in Confucianism-influenced cultures, and contributes to the development of a Confucian or Chinese approach to business ethics. (shrink)

Philosophers and bioethicists are typically sceptical about invocations of dignity in ethical debates. Many believe that dignity is essentially devoid of meaning: either a mere rhetorical gesture used in the absence of good argument or a faddish term for existing values like autonomy and respect. On the other hand, the patient experience of dignity is a substantial area of research in healthcare fields like nursing and palliative care. In this paper, it is argued that philosophers have much to learn from (...) the concrete patient experiences described in healthcare literature. Dignity is conferred on people when they are treated as having equal status, something the sick and frail are often denied in healthcare settings. The importance of equal status as a unique value has been forcefully argued and widely recognised in political philosophy in the last 15 years. This paper brings medical ethics up to date with philosophical discussion about the value of equal status by developing an equal status conception of dignity. (shrink)

Once limited to issues in maritime and trade law, today the most recognizable examples of international law govern issues such as human rights, intellectual property, crimes against humanity and international armed conflicts. In many ways, this proliferation has been a welcomed development. However, when coupled with international law’s decentralized structure, this rapid proliferation has also posed problems for how we (and in particular judges) identify if, when, and where international law exists. This article puts forward a novel, dignity-based account for (...) how we answer this question: arguing that an international law exists if and only if it is consistent with respecting dignity. The upshot of this account is two-fold. First, it explains many features of international law that other theories leave unaccounted for or under-explained. And second, my dignity-based account provides for a mechanism through which the system can continue to be developed and improved. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to sketch and defend a novel conception of dignity. I begin by offering three desiderata that a theory of dignity should be able to satisfy: it should be able to explain why all human beings are owed respect, and what kind of respect we are owed; it should be able to explain how acts such as torture damage dignity, and what kinds of harms this brings about; and finally, it should be able to explain (...) why dignity is held to a higher degree by certain individuals. After demonstrating that the dominant, Kantian-inspired conception of dignity cannot fulfill these desiderata, I develop a novel conception of dignity that centers around the role of normative standards. Dignity, on this conception, involves being subject to, and then upholding, relevant normative standards; to violate someone’s dignity is to prevent them from upholding those standards. Importantly, these standards can have either a subjective or a communal source, which in turn explains both the agential and social harms that accompany dignity violations. I then draw on the idea of social dignity to explain human dignity. Unlike the dominant philosophical conception, I take human dignity to be a status that is conferred, rather than a status that is inherent. (shrink)

In her 2003 article in the British Medical Journal, Ruth Macklin provocatively declared dignity to be a useless concept: either a vague restatement of other more precise values, such as autonomy or respect for persons, or an empty slogan. A recent response to Macklin has challenged this claim. Doris Schroeder attempts to rescue dignity by positing four distinct concepts that fall under the one umbrella term. She argues that much of the confusion surrounding dignity is due to the lack of (...) disambiguation among these four concepts, but that once we understand the different values in question dignity becomes a powerful tool in the fields of human rights and bioethics. It is the goal of this paper to build upon Schroeder's insights by reconnecting the multiple strands of dignity she identifies. It will be argued that the usefulness of dignity as a guiding principle in medical ethics can be much improved by identifying the single conceptual link that ties together the various values flying under its banner. That conceptual link is provided by understanding dignity as the capacity to live by one's standards and principles.



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Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Background: Nursing continues to gain legitimation epistemologically and ontologically as a scientific discipline throughout the world. If a profession gains respect as a true autonomous scientific profession, then this recognition has to be put in practice in all environments and geographical areas. Nursing professional dignity, as a self-regarding concept, does not have a clear definition in the literature, and it has only begun to be analyzed in the last 10 years. Objectives: The purpose of this meta-synthesis was to determine the (...) various factors that constitute the notion of nursing professional dignity. The target was to create a tentative model of the concept. Research design: The research design was a meta-synthesis (N = 15 original articles) of nursing professional dignity described in the literature, based on the guidelines by Noblit and Hare. Method and findings: Original studies were sought out from electronic databases and manual searches. The selection of literature was conducted on stages based on titles (n = 2595), abstracts (n = 70), and full-texts (n = 15) according to the inclusion and exclusion criteria. From this analysis, a clear definition of nursing professional dignity emerged that underscored two main macro-dimensions constituting this intertwined, multidimensional, and complex notion: characteristics of the human beings and workplace elements. Conclusion: The recognition of nursing professional dignity could have a positive impact on patients because the results clearly showed that nurses are more prone to foster patients’ dignity, patients’ safety, and a better quality of care if their own dignity is respected. If nurses are uncomfortable, humiliated, or not seen in their professional role, it is difficult to give to others good care, good support, or good relationships. (shrink)

A surprising lack of consensus exists among contemporary Jewish scholars about Judaism's position vis-à-vis torture. Some claim that Judaism condones torture while others insist that Judaism condemns it. These diverging opinions on such a troubling practice suggest an ambivalence deep within the Judaic textual tradition about torturing bodies. This brief essay critiques both perspectives for twisting the textual tradition and offers some preliminary suggestions for a more robust Judaic approach to torture.

This paper focuses on a distinct puzzle for understanding the relationship between dignity and human rights. The puzzle is that dignity appears to enter human rights theory in two distinct roles: on the one hand, dignity is commonly pointed to as the foundation of human rights, i.e. that in virtue of which we have human rights. On the other hand, dignity is commonly pointed to as that which is at risk in a subset of human rights, paradigmatically torture. But how (...) can dignity underpin all human rights, and yet only be at stake in very specific human rights violations? And if dignity is lost in torture, how can the tortured retain their human rights? In this paper I offer a solution to these puzzles, in the form of a new theory of dignity. On this new theory, an individual’s dignity can be constituted via either of two pathways: the agent’s own normative competencies, or the authority of her community. The former is what’s typically at stake in practices such as torture; it in virtue of the latter that we have human rights. (shrink)

I argue here that the practice of penal torture is not intrinsically wrongful. A common objection against the practice of penal torture is that there is something about penal torture that makes it wrongful, while this is not the case for other modes of punishment. I call this claim the asymmetry thesis. One way to defend this position is to claim that penal torture is intrinsically wrongful. It is the claim I argue against here. I discuss and reject three versions (...) this claim. I first address a version that is based on the idea that penal torture, unlike other modes of punishment, is intrinsically wrong because it is inhuman. I then address a version grounded on the claim that, because penal torture is an assault upon the defenseless, it is morally impermissible. Finally, I discuss a version that concerns the idea that penal torture attacks human dignity and undermine agency. (shrink)