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  1. Emotion, core affect, and psychological construction.James A. Russell - 2009 - Cognition and Emotion 23 (7):1259-1283.
    As an alternative to using the concepts of emotion, fear, anger, and the like as scientific tools, this article advocates an approach based on the concepts of core affect and psychological construction, expanding the domain of inquiry beyond “emotion”. Core affect is a neurophysiological state that underlies simply feeling good or bad, drowsy or energised. Psychological construction is not one process but an umbrella term for the various processes that produce: (a) a particular emotional episode's “components” (such as facial movement, (...)
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  • Can Emotion be Modelled on Perception?Mikko Salmela - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (1):1-29.
    Perceptual theories of emotion purport to avoid the problems of traditional cognitivism and noncognitivism by modelling emotion on perception, which shares the most conspicuous dimensions of emotion, intentionality and phenomenality. In this paper, I shall reconstrue and discuss four key arguments that perceptual theorists have presented in order to show that emotion is a kind of perception, or that there are close analogies between emotion and perception. These arguments are, from stronger to weaker claims: the perceptual system argument; the argument (...)
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  • Emotions, perceptions, and emotional illusions.Christine Tappolet - 2012 - In Calabi Clotilde (ed.), The Crooked Oar, the Moon’s Size and the Kanizsa Triangle. Essays on Perceptual Illusions. pp. 207-24.
    Emotions often misfire. We sometimes fear innocuous things, such as spiders or mice, and we do so even if we firmly believe that they are innocuous. This is true of all of us, and not only of phobics, who can be considered to suffer from extreme manifestations of a common tendency. We also feel too little or even sometimes no fear at all with respect to very fearsome things, and we do so even if we believe that they are fearsome. (...)
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  • Emotion.Ronald de Sousa - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • The Epistemic Role of Outlaw Emotions.Laura Silva - 2021 - Ergo 8 (23).
    Outlaw emotions are emotions that stand in tension with one’s wider belief system, often allowing epistemic insight one may have otherwise lacked. Outlaw emotions are thought to play crucial epistemic roles under conditions of oppression. Although the crucial epistemic value of these emotions is widely acknowledged, specific accounts of their epistemic role(s) remain largely programmatic. There are two dominant accounts of the epistemic role of emotions: The Motivational View and the Justificatory View. Philosophers of emotion assume that these dominant ways (...)
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  • Does the Problem of Variability Justify Barrett’s Emotion Revolution?Raamy Majeed - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1421-1441.
    The problem of variability concerns the fact that empirical data does not support the existence of a coordinated set of biological markers, either in the body or the brain, which correspond to our folk emotion categories; categories like anger, happiness, sadness, disgust and fear. Barrett (2006a, b, 2013, 2016, 2017a, b) employs this fact to argue (i) against the faculty psychology approach to emotion, e.g. emotions are the products of emotion-specific mechanisms, or “modules”, and (ii) for the view that emotions (...)
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  • Emotion.R. De Sousa - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 3.
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