It is a mistake to think that we cannot be morally responsible for forgetting because, as a matter of principle, forgetting is outside of our control. Sometimes we do have control over our forgetting. When forgetting is under our control there is no question that it is the proper object of praise and blame. But we can also be morally responsible for forgetting something when it is beyond our control that we forget that thing. The literature contains three accounts of (...) the blameworthiness of forgetting over which the agent has no control—the tracing account, the liberalized awareness condition, and attributionism. Even though these are competing accounts of the blameworthiness of harmful forgetting they are compatible with one another. In particular, it is possible to come up with a position that endorses the tracing account for certain kinds of harmful forgetting and attributionism for other kinds of harmful forgetting. (shrink)

South. So we have agreed to bury intuitionism. Well, I dare say it is right. But we ought to bury some of the grave-diggers too. Some of the things that Ross said are no doubt wrong, or at least misleading: but they are a lot less wrong than most of the things said since the war.

A menudo se piensa que los estándares genéricos de diligencia son una fuente importante de incertidumbre ya que están radicalmente indeterminados. A fin de favorecer la seguridad jurídica, el derecho de daños debería prescindir de ellos tanto como sea posible y optar por ofrecer estándares específicos, redactados en un lenguaje preciso. En este trabajo argumento que los estándares genéricos no están tan indeterminados como usualmente se asume y que, además, cumplen un papel normativo fundamental en la práctica de la responsabilidad (...) civil. (shrink)

“ Ich liebe dich 3 ” the swains in mountain valleys of Austria inscribe on their presents to those to whom they plight their troth. The pun is a rare one in German. Only in remote valleys does the word for ‘three’ rhyme with joy; and the word for ‘true’ is usually ‘ wahr ’ not ‘ treu ’ ‘ Wahr ’ is more propositional, less evaluative than our ‘true’. So too in Latin and the romance languages ‘ verum ’, (...) ‘ Vrai ’ ‘ vera ’ ‘ verdadero ’ carry a lighter load of feeling. Only the Hebrews resembled us in giving their word for ‘true’ strong moral overtones, and using the same or some cognate word to praise him who had used no deceitfulness to his neighbour as to recommend some statement as being meet to be believed. (shrink)

(1997). Comments: Reality and time. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Vol. 11, Festschrift for J. R. Lucas, pp. 97-108. doi: 10.1080/02698599708573553.