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There is nowadays consensus in the community of didactics of science regarding the need to include the philosophy of science in didactical research, science teacher education, curriculum design, and the practice of science education in all educational levels. Some authors have identified an ever-increasing use of the concept of ‘theoretical model’, stemming from the so-called semantic view of scientific theories. However, it can be recognised that, in didactics of science, there are over-simplified transpositions of the idea of model. In this (...) |
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The aim of the present paper is to show that the formalism of equilibrium quantum statistical mechanics can fully be incorporated into Ludwig's embedding scheme for classical theories in many-body quantum mechanics. A construction procedure based on a recently developed reconstruction procedure for the so-called macro-observable is presented which leads to the explicit determination of the set of classical ensembles compatible with the embedding scheme. |
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In this paper, a new account of empirical claims in structuralism is developed. Its novelty derives from the use that is made of the linguistic approach to scientific theories despite the presumed incompatibility of structuralism with that approach. It is shown how the linguistic approach can be applied to the framework of structuralism if the semantic foundations of that approach are refined to do justice to the doctrine of indirect interpretation of theoretical terms. This doctrine goes back to Carnap but (...) |
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With Humean empiricism and its agnostic stance regarding the future as a foil, I take a bird’s eye view of the links between past and future prescribed by ordinary concepts of everyday things and processes, and by scientific models of phenomenal situations. I argue that they entitle us to claim knowledge of the future—including, where appropriate, its necessary course—in a humanly affordable sense of ‘knowledge’. |
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An exact formulation of the frequency interpretation of probability is proposed on the basis of G. Ludwig's concept of physical theories. Starting from a short outline of this concept, a formal definition of weak approximate reduction is developed, which covers the reduction of probability to frequency as a special case. |
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There are various concepts of states in physics. Sometimes they are not formulated precisely. This leads to many misunderstandings. We try to give rigorous definitions for classical states, statistical states, and hidden states and to describe the relations between these various concepts. |
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The present article covers the first part of our constructive-axiomatic approach to general spacetime, guided by Ludwig's conception of an axiomatic base. The leading idea of axiomatization is a generalized version of the equivalence principle—the principle of approximative reproducibility. As fundamental concepts we use processes and reproductions of processes. On the universe of processes the point space of events is founded which carries the familiar properties of spacetime topology. A general contact relation for reproductions is the key structure to build (...) |
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The reality of atoms can be deduced from the reality of the devices by which the atoms are prepared and registered. A new, most general definition of the concept of “physical object” is given. The objects must not be classical; nevertheless they can be described objectively. Atoms are not such objects. |
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In this paper I propose clearly to distinguish four fundamental types of intertheoretical relations that may be used to represent different types of theoretical change in empirical science. These four types can be represented formally through a refined version of the set-theoretical apparatus of structuralism. They may be described as: crystallization, theory-evolution, embedding, and replacement with partial incommensurability. They will be first explicated in intuitive, informal terms, and some historical examples will be suggested for each type. In the second part (...) |
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ZusammenfassungEs wird gezeigt, dass sich die Unterschiede zwischen der Quantenmechanik‐Interpretation von von Weizsäcker/Drieschner und der von Ludwig auf die jeweils unterschiedliche Beantwor‐tung der folgenden Fragen zurückführen lassen:–Was ist der Referent von Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen in der Quantenmechanik?–Sind Gesamtheiten Mengen von Objekten?–Umfasst der Gültigkeitsbereich der Quantenmechanik auch die Messgeräte? |
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Patrick Suppes' set-theoretical approach to the analysis of theories, and Joseph D. Sneed's metatheory are briefly outlined. The notions of observation, illusion and hallucination are reconstructed according to these approaches. It is argued that the terms ‘perception’ and ‘truth’ are theoretical with respect to observation but nontheoretical with respect to illusion and hallucination. Hallucination is construed as a special kind of illusion. |
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