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  1. A new argument for the incompatibility of content externalism with justification internalism.Mahmoud Morvarid - 2021 - Synthese 198 (3):2333-2353.
    Several lines of reasoning have been proposed to show the incompatibility of content externalism with justification internalism. In this paper I examine two such lines of reasoning, which both rely on the general idea that since content externalism is incompatible with certain aspects of the alleged privileged character of self-knowledge, it would tend to undermine justification internalism as well. I shall argue that both lines of reasoning, as they stand, lack plausibility, though the core idea of the second line can (...)
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  • A Defense of Presentist Externalism.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (2):259-274.
    This article presents a defense of “presentist externalism,” that is, the claim that memory contents are fixed by the environment and by the time at which a recollection takes place rather than by those at which the original mental state occurred. Its case is an instance of an argument to the best explanation. The author argues, firstly, that “presentist externalism” is the only version of content externalism that can stand up to both Boghossian’s memory and fallacy arguments. In slow switching (...)
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  • Difficulties in generating scepticism about knowledge of content.A. Brueckner - 1999 - Analysis 59 (1):59-62.
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  • Externalism, privileged self-knowledge, and the irrelevance of slow switching.Ted A. Warfield - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):282-284.
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  • (1 other version)Essays on Skepticism.Mikkel Gerken - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (1):65-77.
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  • Externalism, inclusion, and knowledge of content.Carlos J. Moya - 2002 - In María José Frápolli & Esther Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. University of Chicago Press. pp. 773-800.
    In this paper I address the question whether self-knowledge is compatible with an externalist individuation of mental content. Against some approaches, I consider self-knowledge as a genuine cognitive achievement. Though it is neither incorrigible nor infallible, self-knowledge is direct, a priori (no based on empirical investigation), presumptively true and authoritative. The problem is whether self-knowledge, so understood, is compatible with externalism. My answer will be affirmative. I will defend this species of compatibilism against several objections, in particular those based on (...)
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  • On the relevance of slow switching.Peter Ludlow - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):285-86.
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  • (Nonstandard) lessons from world-switching cases.Sanford Goldberg - 2005 - Philosophia 32 (1-4):85-131.
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  • Memory and Externalism.Sven Bernecker - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):605-632.
    Content externalism about memory says that the individuation of memory contents depends on relations the subject bears to his past environment. I defend externalism about memory by arguing that neither philosophical nor psychological considerations stand in the way of accepting the context dependency of memory that follows from externalism.
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  • Externalism, Memory, and Self-Knowledge.K. J. Kraay - 2002 - Erkenntnis 56 (3):297-317.
    Externalism holds that the individuation of mental content depends on factors external to the subject. This doctrine appears to undermine both the claim that there is a priori self-knowledge, and the view that individuals have privileged access to their thoughts. Tyler Burge's influential "inclusion theory of self-knowledge" purports to reconcile externalism with authoritative self-knowledge. I first consider Paul Boghossian's claim that the inclusion theory is internally inconsistent. I reject one line of response to this charge, but I endorse another. I (...)
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  • Holism, relevance, and thought content.Henry Jackman - 1999 - Proceedings of the Ohio Philosophical Association 1999:140-151.
    NB: This paper has been largely displaced by my: “Externalism, Metasemantic Contextualism and Self-Knowledge”, in Goldberg, (ed.) Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 228-247. // -/- While straightforwardly ambiguous words like “bank” and obviously indexical words like “I” are unproblematically treated as referring to different things in different contexts, such variations are displayed by terms that seem neither ambiguous nor indexical. This paper will argue that traditional accounts of word meaning (in which a single fixed (...)
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  • The dialectical context of Boghossian's memory argument.Sanford Goldberg - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):135-48.
    Externalism1 is the thesis that some propositional attitudes depend for their individuation on features of the thinker’s (social and/or physical) environment. The doctrine of self-knowledge of thoughts is the thesis that for all thinkers S and occurrent thoughts that p, S has authoritative and non-empirical knowledge of her thought that p. A much-discussed question in the literature is whether these two doctrines are compatible. In this paper I attempt to respond to one argument for an incompatibilist conclusion, Boghossian’s 1989 ‘Memory (...)
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  • Must Differences in Cognitive Value be Transparent?Sanford Goldberg - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (2):165-187.
    Frege’s ‘differential dubitability’ test is a test for differences in cognitive value: if one can rationally believe that p while simultaneously doubting that q, then the contents p and q amount to different ‘cognitive values’. If subject S is rational, does her simultaneous adoption of different attitudes towards p and q require that the difference between p and q(as cognitive values) be transparent to her? It is natural to think so. But I argue that, if attitude anti-individualism is true, then (...)
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  • The Discrimination Argument: A Reply to Dierig.Mahmoud Morvarid - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):1209-1219.
    Boghossian’s discrimination argument aims to show that content externalism undermines the privileged access thesis. Simon Dierig has recently proposed a new objection to Boghossian’s argument according to which having a “twater thought” is not an alternative, and a fortiori not a relevant alternative, to possessing a “water thought”. Dierig also considers, and criticizes, a modified version of the discrimination argument which would be immune to his objection. I shall argue, first, that he fails to advance a successful objection to the (...)
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  • Narrow memory and wide knowledge: An argument for the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. [REVIEW]Ping Tian - 2009 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):604-615.
    The development of the semantic externalism in the 1970s was followed by a debate on the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. Boghossian’s memory argument is one of the most important arguments against the compatibilist view. However, some compatibilists attack Boghossian’s argument by pointing out that his understanding of memory is internalistic. Ludlow and others developed the externalist view of memory to defend the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. However, the externalist view of memory undermines the epistemic status of memory since (...)
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  • Conceptual equivocation and epistemic relevance.Mikkel Gerken - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (2):117-132.
    Much debate has surrounded "switching" scenarios in which a subject's reasoning is said to exhibit the fallacy of equivocation ( Burge 1988 ; Boghossian 1992, 1994 ). Peter Ludlow has argued that such scenarios are "epistemically prevalent" and, therefore, epistemically relevant alternatives ( Ludlow 1995a ). Since a distinctive feature of the cases in question is that the subject blamelessly engages in conceptual equivocation, we may label them 'equivocational switching cases'. Ludlow's influential argument occurs in a discussion about compatibilism with (...)
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  • Externalism and the memory argument.Yujin Nagasawa - 2002 - Dialectica 56 (4):335-46.
    Pa ul Boghos s i a n’ s ‘ Me mor y Ar gume nt ’ a l l ege dl y s hows , us i ng t he f ami l i a r s l ow-switching scenario, that externalism and authoritative self-knowledge are incompatible. The aim of this paper is to undermine the argument by examining..
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  • Anti-Individualism, Content Preservation, and Discursive Justification.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2007 - Noûs 41 (2):178-203.
    Most explorations of the epistemic implications of Semantic Anti- Individualism (SAI) focus on issues of self-knowledge (first-person au- thority) and/or external-world skepticism. Less explored has been SAIs implications forthe epistemology of reasoning. In this paperI argue that SAI has some nontrivial implications on this score. I bring these out by reflecting on a problem first raised by Boghossian (1992). Whereas Boghos- sians main interest was in establishing the incompatibility of SAI and the a priority of logical abilities (Boghossian 1992: 22), (...)
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  • Externalism, transparency, and diagonal propositions.Gregory Bochner - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-23.
    Boghossian argued that externalism is incompatible with a transparency thesis according to which we can know a priori whether any two of our occurrent thoughts have the same or distinct content, and that this transparency thesis is integral to our commonsense conception of rationality, which requires the apriority of our logical abilities. Stalnaker offered a detailed compatibilist response to Boghossian. Boghossian criticized this response, and Stalnaker replied. But the outcome of that important discussion remained unclear, partly because it was unclear (...)
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  • The relevance of discriminatory knowledge of content.Sanford C. Goldberg - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (2):136-56.
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80:2, 136-56 (June 1999).
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  • Externalist Self-Knowledge and the Scope of the A Priori.Richard W. Miller - 1997 - Analysis 57 (1):67-75.
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  • Personal identity and mental content.James Baillie - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):323-33.
    In this paper, I attempt to map out the 'logical geography' of the territory in which issues of mental content and of personal identity meet. In particular, I investigate the possibility of combining a psychological criterion of personal identity with an externalist theory of content. I argue that this can be done, but only by accepting an assumption that has been widely accepted but barely argued for, namely that when someone switches linguistic communities, the contents of their thoughts do not (...)
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  • Quick Triviality Proofs for Probabilities of Conditionals.Peter Milne - 1997 - Analysis 57 (1):75-80.
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  • Concept Possession, Cognitive Value and Anti-Individualism.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2014 - Dialogue 53 (1):1-25.
    Les conditions de possession permettant l’individuation des concepts, bien que peu étudiées, constituent l’un des lieux fondamentaux de la polémique opposant les points de vue frégéen et anti-individualiste. Dans cet article, je décris une théorie compatibiliste de la valeur cognitive qui réunit des conditions de possession anti-individualistes et individualistes. Je soutiens que cette approche générale de la compatibilité des explications frégéenne et anti-individualiste de la possession de concepts suffit à mettre en doute l’idée voulant que la déférence et la transparence (...)
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