Obstetric violence has been analyzed from various perspectives. Its psychological effects have been evaluated, and there have been several recent sociological and anthropological studies on the subject. But what I offer in this paper is a philosophical analysis of obstetric violence, particularly focused on how this violence is lived and experienced by women and why it is frequently described not only in terms of violence in general but specifically in terms of gender violence: as violence directed at women because they (...) are women. For this purpose, I find feminist phenomenology most useful as a way to explain and account for the feelings that many victims of this violence experience and report, including feelings of embodied oppression, of the diminishment of self, of physical and emotional infantilization. I believe that the insights to be found in feminist phenomenology are crucial for explaining how and why this phenomenon is different in kind from other types of medical violence, objectification, and reification. Iris Marion Young’s description of feminine existence under patriarchy, as conformed by a perpetual oppressive “I cannot,” is at the center of my analysis. I argue that laboring bodies are at least potentially perceived as antithetical to the myth of femininity, undermining the feminine mode of bodily comportment under patriarchy and thereby seriously threatening the hegemonic powers. Violence, then, appears to be necessary in order to domesticate these bodies, to make them “feminine” again. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to get from a phenomenology of birth towards an ethics of obstetric care: Human rights violations in obstetrics are currently a globally debated phenomenon. Research suggests that maltreatment is widespread and a global phenomenon. However, the prevalence cannot yet be clearly quantified. In view of this problem, it is necessary to take the subjective perspective of those affected seriously. Narrative and phenomenological accounts of birth experiences could help to foster the dialogue between persons giving (...) birth and health professionals. First, I will present narrative accounts of birth experiences recorded by feminist phenomenologists. Second, I will interpret these narrative accounts within a feminist phenomenological framework in order to contribute to a phenomenology of birth, which, in a third step, shall help to develop an ethics of obstetric care. In engaging with the phenomenology of care outlined by feminist care ethicists, I will analyze the elements and conditions of good care, and draw conclusions for an ethic of obstetric and midwifery care. Drawing additionally on the theory of relational autonomy, my paper argues for a relational implementation of self-determination in childbirth. Lastly, I will discuss to what extent the ethical ideal of care has an affinity to the midwifery model of childbirth, and how the current situation of obstetrics prevents a women-centered birth culture. (shrink)

Traditional western conceptions of pain have commonly associated pain with the inability to communicate and with the absence of the self. Thus pain, it seems, must be avoided, since it is to blame for alienating the body from subjectivity and the self from others. Recent work on pain, however, has began to challenge these assumptions, mainly by discerning between different kinds of pain and by pointing out how some forms of pain might even constitute a crucial element in the production (...) of subjectivity. This article deals with the specific form of pain that is labour pain. Pain in labour has been investigated in medicine and lately, copiously, within the social sciences. Analyses from a more philosophical perspective are still very much missing, however, and in developing such analyses, de Beauvoir’s ideas on subjectivity as inherently embodied, as situated, and as profoundly ambiguous when authentically lived, appear to be of significant use. (shrink)