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Past Desires and the Dead

Philosophical Studies 126 (3):331-345 (2005)

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Posthumous Harm and Changing Desires.Andrea S. Asker - 2024 - Utilitas 36 (2):115-129.details The desire-satisfactionist defense of the existence of posthumous harm faces the problem of changing desires. The problem is that, in some cases where desires change before the time of their objects, the principle underlying the desire-satisfactionist defense of posthumous harm yields implausible results. In his prominent desire-satisfactionist defense of posthumous harm, David Boonin proposes a solution to this problem. First, I argue that there are two relevantly different versions of the problem of changing desires, and that Boonin's proposed solution addresses (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
How (Not) to Fear Death.Susanne Burri - 2024 - Public Affairs Quarterly 38 (1):45-61.details Through the ages, many thinkers have worried that our death fears mar our lives. Sharing this worry, the Epicureans have argued that we can live well only if we see death for what it is: a mere “nothing” that it is ill-fitting to fear. I show how this argument depends on the assumption that a mental state theory of well-being is correct. If we give up this assumption, it can be fitting to fear death. Using my philosophical discussion of when (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Harm.Michael Rabenberg - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (3):1-32.details In recent years, philosophers have proposed a variety of accounts of the nature of harm. In this paper, I consider several of these accounts and argue that they are unsuccessful. I then make a modest case for a different view. Download Export citation Bookmark 24 citations
Present Desire Satisfaction and Past Well-Being.Donald W. Bruckner - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):15 - 29.details One version of the desire satisfaction theory of well-being (i.e., welfare, or what is good for one) holds that only the satisfaction of one's present desires for present states of affairs can affect one's well-being. So if I desire fame today and become famous tomorrow, my well-being is positively affected onlyif tomorrow, when I am famous, I still desire to be famous. Call this the present desire satisfaction theory of well-being. I argue, contrary to this theory, that the satisfaction of (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 22 citations
Welfare and Posthumous Harm.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscriptdetails WHEN ONE ASSUMES, as I will, that death marks the irrevocable end to one’s existence, it is difficult to make sense of the idea that a person could be harmed or benefited by events that take place after her death. How could a posthumous event either enhance or diminish the welfare of the deceased, who no longer exists? Yet we find that many people have a prudential (i.e., self-interested) concern for what’s going to happen after their deaths.1 People are, for (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
(1 other version)Death.Steven Luper - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details First, what constitutes a person's death? It is clear enough that people die when their lives end, but less clear what constitutes the ending of a person's life. Download Export citation Bookmark 21 citations

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