Hesitation is a phenomenological moment. One is disturbed when, unexpectedly, someone else is there. There is that sharp intake of breath which accompanies being taken by surprise, and even a suspension of time, before one exhales. The other person takes us by surprise and often jolts us out of self-complacency and self-contentment, but also introduces us and invites us into a situation of responsibility in which the ego is no longer for itself but for the other. This is declining subjectivity (...) otherwise and in terms of the other. This short article takes as its point of departure a simple incident: one halts or gives way before someone pushing a child's pram. One says, 'after you.' With Levinas and Blanchot, this moment of 'giving way' needs to be phenomenologically frozen in that very moment of giving way, for hesitation is a hesitation in being. 'To be' is a reflexive verb, and existence is already fissured. Into this wound within existence, an other may enter, and provide an exit from ontology to ethics. (shrink)

Una lectura positiva del Ser en el sentido levinasiano es lo mismo que abrir el espacio para preguntar por un sentido ético del Hay. Esta posibilidad se puede contemplar si pasamos de la designación negativa de la poesía, cuya función parece limitarse a denunciar y deshacer la totalidad a la que somete la ontología experimentando la noche y el horror, a su anunciación de una tierra inhabitable y cuya única ruptura radica en un decir más allá del habla de lo (...) neutro. Para esto, la poesía debe ella misma salir hacia la intemperie, recorrer el camino mismo del arte, hacia el encuentro con el otro. (shrink)

In marked contrast to Husserlian “unities of sense” that structure consciousness around _egoic_ ideal-meaning intention, contemporary phenomenology orders sense according to an excess of givenness – a surfeit of presence – that surpasses this intentional relation. But Emmanuel Falque argues that there is a resistance that _precedes_ the phenomenological order of givenness and sense. Before the saturated phenomena (Marion), the _pathos_ of the flesh (Henry), and the irruption of the Other (Levinas), there is a resistance of presence that is not (...) _sensu stricto_ given at all. Falque turns to the early writings of Emmanuel Levinas on trauma and insomnia and the hum and buzz of the _il y a_ (the “there is …”) that precedes the order of givenness and sense, including the Levinasian Other, in order to make sense of this _a priori_ resistance. There is a presence of the body, experienced in some sense via trauma, insomnia, and Falque’s own notion of the “spread body” that is not given yet constitutes an integral part of embodied experience. The way Falque engages with these bodily experiences reformulates the phenomenological limit, not in terms of excess and givenness, but in terms of resistance and the “extra-phenomenon.” Phenomenological engagement with resistance thus becomes a wager on meaning and sense, the outcome of which cannot be known in advance, that is, cannot be always and already ordered to phenomenological givenness. (shrink)

Levinas est traditionnellement perçu comme une voix critique à propos de la pensée de la totalité de Hegel et, ainsi, comme un philosophe qui cherche à dénoncer la négation de toute différence dans la pensée de l’identité, que ce soit dans l’unité de la vie, de l’esprit, du savoir ou du concept. Or, le paradoxe de Levinas est de critiquer Hegel tout en réinterprétant et en s’appropriant certains de ses concepts fondamentaux. Plus particulièrement, c'est le cas avec la radicalisation de (...) la puissance du négatif. Il s’agit donc de s’interroger sur l’effort de Levinas pour développer une forme intrinsèque à la dialectique hégélienne que Hegel aurait entrevue sans développer dans sa philosophie, encore trop enracinée dans une métaphysique que Levinas tente de quitter. Ce faisant, il s’agit d’éclaircir si l’on peut même parler d’une dialectique négative lévinassienne. (shrink)