RESUMO A partir do exame da tradição heraclitiana e platônica sobre a transitoriedade e a imortalidade - conceitos compreendidos como universais - este artigo defende a seguinte antinomia como tese: para haver temporalidade é preciso haver eternidade. Essa tese é demonstrada por meio do estudo e atualização das noções de alma, espírito, ideia e memória, as quais estão conectadas invariavelmente ao tempo passado como princípio ontológico do fenômeno histórico. Para além do ponto de vista filosófico, portanto, da perspectiva específica do (...) conhecimento histórico, este estudo expõe algumas implicações teóricas acerca das condições de possibilidade da história, que são discutidas, finalmente, em diálogo com Friedrich Nietzsche e Jacob Burckhardt. ABSTRACT From the analysis of the Heraclitian and Platonic tradition on transience and immortality - understood as universal concepts - this essay defends the following antinomy as its thesis: if there is temporality there must be eternity. This thesis is demonstrated through the study and updating of the notions of soul, spirit, idea and memory, which are invariably connected to the past as the ontological principle of the historical phenomenon. Beyond the philosophical point of view, therefore, from the specific perspective of historical knowledge, this study exposes some theoretical implications about the conditions of possibility of history, which are finally discussed in dialogue with Friedrich Nietzsche and Jacob Burckhardt. (shrink)

This paper presents and discusses Karl Löwith’s anthropological critique of existential analytic that is formulated in his Habilitation thesis (Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen, 1928), where he develops an anthropological counter-paradigm, i. e.Mitanthropologie, in opposition to Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. Given the extent and the complexity of such a subject, I will limit the present inquiry to two specific topics: theMiteinandersein(Being-with-one-another) and above all theSein zum Tode(Being-towards-death). In practice, I will first explain the basic features of Mitanthropologie together with (...) the crucial critique that it levels atBeing and Time. I will follow by outlining the importance of theTodesfrage(the question of death) within the existential analytic by means of a comparison between Heidegger’sBeing-towards-deathand Kierkegaard’sSickness unto death(Krankheit zum Tode). Finally, I will expound Löwith’s objection toBeing-towards-death, which is expressed in the alternative formulaFreiheit zum Tode(Freedom-towards-death). (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis essay tracks Heidegger’s thought from 1919 forwards to the decisive years of his political engagement, on behalf of the Nazi movement. Part 1 tracks how the question concerning Being devolves into the implicitly identitarian question of who “we” are. Part 2 addresses the “existential” of Befindlichkeit which Heidegger in Sein und Zeit positions as prior to understanding, and examines his esoteric mode of writing as the means to cultivate a prerational Stimmung. Part 3 examines Heidegger’s response to his 1929–1930 (...) questions of “What mood must we awaken?... Who are we, then?” in the decisive years of the Gleichchaltung, showing how Heidegger’s thinking elevates to ontological primacy a discriminatory and identitarian decision concerning who “we” are as the German volk. Part 4 examines in this light the Heideggerian “end of philosophy” in what the Black Notebooks talks of in terms of a “metapolitics ‘of’ the historical people”. (shrink)

Gewürdigt wird die Philosophie, die Karl Löwith in der Weimarer Zeit formuliert hat. Es wird gezeigt, wie Löwith zwischen Existenzphilosophie und marxistischer Theorie und aus den Wurzeln des 19. Jahrhunderts eine anthropologische Philosophie entwickelte.

Reseña del libro: Martin Heidegger y Karl Löwith, Briefwechsel. 1919–1973 -/- .

El artículo busca discutir algunos de los posicionamientos de Heidegger en su época nazi, mostrando que la base de su error político está en su nacionalismo. Esto lo ha hecho caer en una interpretación de la historia de Alemania como una opción opuesta a la modernidad y lo ha inducido a perder de vista las relaciones de interdependencia mutua entre facticidad y trascendencia. El nacionalismo se presenta así como un desvío del propósito universalista de la filosofía y el error de (...) Heidegger como un abandono del propósito esencial de la filosofía. We discuss some aspects of Heidegger's stance during his nazi period. We show that the root of his political error lies in his nationalism. This led him to understand the history of Germany as an option opposed to modernity, while losing sight of the mutual dependence of facticity and transcendence. Nationalism appears thus as a deviation from the universalist aim of philosophy and Heidegger's error as defection from philosophy's essential purpose. (shrink)