We introduce a new framework for asymptotic probabilities of sentences, in which we have a σ-additive measure on the sample space of all sequences A = {A n } of finite models, where the universe of A n is {1,2... n}, and use this framework to strengthen 0-1 laws for logics.

We introduce a new framework for asymptotic probabilities of sentences, in which we have a σ-additive measure on the sample space of all sequencesA= {} of finite models, where the universe ofis {1,2, …, n}. and use this framework to strengthen 0-1 laws for logics.

In 2001, Le Bars proved that there exists an existential monadic second-order sentence such that the probability that it is true on [Formula: see text] does not converge and conjectured that, for EMSO sentences with two first-order variables, the zero–one law holds. In this paper, we prove that the conjecture fails for [Formula: see text], and give new examples of sentences with fewer variables without convergence.

For every k ∈ ω, there is an infinite set $A_k \subseteq \omega$ and a d(k) ∈ ω such that for all $Q_0, Q_1 \subseteq A_k$ where |Q 0 | = |Q 1 or $d(k) , the structures $\langle \omega, +, Q_0\rangle$ and $\langle \omega, +, Q_1\rangle$ are indistinguishable by first-order sentences of quantifier depth k whose atomic formulas are of the form u = v, u + v = w, and Q(u), where u, v, and w are variables.

Motivated by problems that arise in computing degrees of belief, we consider the problem of computing asymptotic conditional probabilities for first-order sentences. Given first-order sentences φ and θ, we consider the structures with domain {1,..., N} that satisfy θ, and compute the fraction of them in which φ is true. We then consider what happens to this fraction as N gets large. This extends the work on 0-1 laws that considers the limiting probability of first-order sentences, by considering asymptotic conditional (...) probabilities. As shown by Liogon'kii [24], if there is a non-unary predicate symbol in the vocabulary, asymptotic conditional probabilities do not always exist. We extend this result to show that asymptotic conditional probabilities do not always exist for any reasonable notion of limit. Liogon'kii also showed that the problem of deciding whether the limit exists is undecidable. We analyze the complexity of three problems with respect to this limit: deciding whether it is well-defined, whether it exists, and whether it lies in some nontrivial interval. Matching upper and lower bounds are given for all three problems, showing them to be highly undecidable. (shrink)

From classical, Fraïissé-homogeneous, ($\leq \omega$)-categorical theories over finite relational languages, we construct intuitionistic theories that are complete, prove negations of classical tautologies, and admit quantifier elimination. We also determine the intuitionistic universal fragments of these theories.

Given a finite lexicon L of relational symbols and equality, one may view the collection of all L-structures on the set of natural numbers ω as a space in several different ways. We consider it as: (i) the space of outcomes of certain infinite two-person games; (ii) a compact metric space; and (iii) a probability measure space. For each of these viewpoints, we can give a notion of relative ubiquity, or largeness, for invariant sets of structures on ω. For example, (...) in every sense of relative ubiquity considered here, the set of dense linear orderings on ω is ubiquitous in the set of linear orderings on ω. (shrink)

For $n < \omega$ , expand the structure (n, S, I, F) (with S the successor relation, I, F as the initial and final element) by forming graphs with edge probability n-α for irrational α, with $0 < \alpha < 1$ . The sentences in the expanded language, which have limit probability 1, form a complete and stable theory.