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Emotion

Cambridge University Press (1985)

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  1. La dimensión cognitiva de las pasiones : la vigencia de Aristóteles en la psicología moral contemporánea = The cognition of passions : the contemporary relevance of the Aristotelian thought in moral psychology.Diego S. Garrocho Salcedo - 2013 - Endoxa 31:15.
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  • Emotion and Full Understanding.Charles Starkey - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):425-454.
    Aristotle has famously made the claim that having the right emotion at the right time is an essential part of moral virtue. Why might this be the case? I consider five possible relations between emotion and virtue and argue that an adequate answer to this question involves the epistemic status of emotion, that is, whether the perceptual awareness and hence the understanding of the object of emotion is like or unlike the perceptual awareness of an unemotional awareness of the same (...)
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  • The Role of the Visual System in Emotion Perception.Edoardo Zamuner - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):179-187.
    Looking at a person’s expression is a good way of telling what she feels—what emotions she has. Why is that? Is it because we see her emotion, or is it because we infer her mental state from her expression? My claim is that there is a sense in which we do see the person’s emotion. I first argue that expressions are physical events that carry information about the emotions that produce them. I then examine evidence suggesting that specific brain areas (...)
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  • (1 other version)Posidonius on Emotions and Non-Conceptual Content.Bill Wringe - 2011 - Prolegomena 10 (2):185-213.
    In this paper I argue that the work of the unorthodox Stoic Posidonius - as reported to us by Galen - can be seen as making an interesting contribution to contemporary debates about the nature of emotion. Richard Sorabji has already argued that Posidonius' contribution highlights the weaknesses in some well-known contemporary forms of cognitivism. Here I argue that Posidonius might be seen as advocating a theory of the emotions which sees them as being, in at least some cases, two-level (...)
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  • The Rationality of Grief.Carolyn Price - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):20-40.
    Donald Gustafson has argued that grief centres on a combination of belief and desire:The belief that the subject has suffered an irreparable loss.The desire that this should not be the case.And yet, as Gustafson points out, if the belief is true, the desire cannot be satisfied. Gustafson takes this to show that grief inevitably implies an irrational conflict between belief and desire.I offer a partial defence of grief against Gustafson's charge of irrationality. My defence rests on two elements. First, I (...)
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  • On irrational guilt.Juha Räikkä - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):473 - 485.
    A person raised in a religious family may have been taught that going to the theater is not allowed, and even if he has rejected this taboo years ago, he still feels guilty when attending theater. These kinds of cases may not be rare, but they are strange. Indeed, one may wonder how they are even possible. This is why an explanation is needed, and in my paper I aim to give such an explanation. In particular, I will first provide (...)
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  • The phenomenology and intentionality of emotion.York H. Gunther - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):43-55.
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  • (1 other version)Animal Emotions.Beth Dixon - 2001 - Ethics and the Environment 6 (2):22-30.
    Recent work in the area of ethics and animals suggests that it is philosophically legitimate to ascribe emotions to nonhuman animals. Furthermore, it is sometimes argued that emotionality is a morally relevant psychological state shared by humans and nonhumans. What is missing from the philosophical literature that makes reference to emotions in nonhuman animals is an attempt to clarify and defend some particular account of the nature of emotion, and the role that emotions play in a characterization of human nature. (...)
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  • Emotional clichés and authentic passions: A phenomenological revision of a cognitive theory of emotion.Kym Maclaren - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):45-65.
    This paper argues for an understanding of emotion based upon Merleau-Ponty's conceptions of embodiment and passivity. Through a critical assessment of cognitive theories of emotion, and in particular Solomon's theory, it argues (1) that there is a sense in which emotions may be judgments, so long as we understand such judgments as bodily enactments of meaning, but (2) that even understood in this way, the notion of judgment (or construal) can only account for a subset of emotions which I call (...)
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  • Philosophie als Medicina Mentis? Zu den Voraussetzungen und Grenzen eines umstrittenen Philosophiebegriffs.Ursula Renz - 2010 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (1):17-30.
    In ancient as well as in early modern theories of emotion, philosophy is often described as some kind of therapy. However, the assumption that philosophical reflection can influence our emotional life is only plausible, if the following requirements are met. First, one has to defend a realist account of self-knowledge. Second, one must allow for some kind of constructivism in regard to the description of one′s own experience. Finally, one has to maintain a strictly cognitivist conception of emotion. The article (...)
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  • The rationality of faith and the benefits of religion.Brian Ballard - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81 (1-2):213-227.
    Religions don’t simply make claims about the world; they also offer existential resources, resources for dealing with basic human problems, such as the need for meaning, love, identity, and personal growth. For instance, a Buddhist’s resources for addressing these existential needs are different than a Christian’s. Now, imagine someone who is agnostic but who is deciding whether to put faith in religion A or religion B. Suppose she thinks A and B are evidentially on par, but she regards A as (...)
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  • A revision of the definition of lying as an untruth told with intent to deceive.Warren Shibles - 1988 - Argumentation 2 (1):99-115.
    The traditional and prevailing definition of lying is that lying is some variation or combination of: “an untruth told with intent to deceive.” I establish that this is the case, and that, as a result, contradictions and injustices arise. An alternative definition is proposed which is shown to avoid these difficulties. It is also shown that and how on the new definition the alleged “Liar paradox” is easily dissolved.
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  • Chasing the bear: William James on senstations, emotions and instincts.Anna Stoklosa - 2012 - William James Studies 9 (1).
    William James’s account of emotions is frequently categorised as a feeling theory of emotions. Consideration of James’s views about sensations, however, reveals that this categorisation is untenable. Instead, many of James’s emotions are more appropriately categorised as instincts. The categorisation of emotions as instincts entails that emotions do have a function–contrary to a criticism often levied against James’s account.
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  • The heat of emotion: Valence and the demarcation problem.Louis Charland - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):82-102.
    Philosophical discussions regarding the status of emotion as a scientific domain usually get framed in terms of the question whether emotion is a natural kind. That approach to the issues is wrongheaded for two reasons. First, it has led to an intractable philosophical impasse that ultimately misconstrues the character of the relevant debate in emotion science. Second, and most important, it entirely ignores valence, a central feature of emotion experience, and probably the most promising criterion for demarcating emotion from cognition (...)
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  • Cognitive And Heideggerian Approaches To The Question: What Is The Object Of Objectless Fear?Kevin Sludds - 2011 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7 (1):49-60.
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  • The Problem of Emotional Significance.Carolyn Price - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):189-206.
    What does it mean to say that an emotional response fits the situation? This question cannot be answered simply by specifying the core relational theme (loss or risk, say) associated with each emotion: we must also explain what constitutes an emotionally significant loss or risk. It is sometimes suggested that emotionally significant situations are those that bear on the subject’s interests or concerns. I accept that this claim is plausible for some emotional responses, and I propose a particular way of (...)
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  • Neither here nor there: the cognitive nature of emotion.Remy Debes - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):1-27.
    The philosophy of emotion has long been divided over the cognitive nature of emotion. In this paper I argue that this debate suffers from deep confusion over the meaning of “cognition” itself. This confusion has in turn obscured critical substantive agreement between the debate’s principal opponents. Capturing this agreement and remedying this confusion requires re-conceptualizing “the cognitive” as it functions in first-order theories of emotion. Correspondingly, a sketch for a new account of cognitivity is offered. However, I also argue that (...)
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  • Affectivity as an Underlying Factor in Anticipating an Individual’s Approach to the Future.Robert Zaborowski - 2019 - Axiomathes 29 (1):49-60.
    In approaching the future, i.e. in planning projects and decision-making, the role of both affective and non-affective factors is considerable. But given that affectivity is not a homogeneous realm and that it is difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the affective and non-affective elements of a description, anticipation can be hardly described as purely affective, and, on the other, it is necessary to consider what kind or level of the hierarchical realm of affectivity is involved in the anticipation move. In (...)
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  • The Rationality and Functionality of Emotions.Aaron Ben-Ze'ev - 2000 - The European Legacy 5 (1):49-63.
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