Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Great Minds do not Think Alike: Philosophers’ Views Predicted by Reflection, Education, Personality, and Other Demographic Differences.Nick Byrd - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (2):647-684.
    Prior research found correlations between reflection test performance and philosophical tendencies among laypeople. In two large studies (total N = 1299)—one pre-registered—many of these correlations were replicated in a sample that included both laypeople and philosophers. For example, reflection test performance predicted preferring atheism over theism and instrumental harm over harm avoidance on the trolley problem. However, most reflection-philosophy correlations were undetected when controlling for other factors such as numeracy, preferences for open-minded thinking, personality, philosophical training, age, and gender. Nonetheless, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Demographic Differences in Philosophical Intuition: a Reply to Joshua Knobe.Stephen P. Stich & Edouard Machery - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (2):401-434.
    In a recent paper, Joshua Knobe (2019) offers a startling account of the metaphilosophical implications of findings in experimental philosophy. We argue that Knobe’s account is seriously mistaken, and that it is based on a radically misleading portrait of recent work in experimental philosophy and cultural psychology.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • (1 other version)When “replicability” is more than just “reliability”: The Hubble constant controversy.Vera Matarese & C. D. McCoy - 2024 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 107:1-10.
    We propose that the epistemic functions of replication in science are best understood by relating them to kinds of experimental error/uncertainty. One kind of replication, which we call “direct replications,” principally serves to assess the reliability of an experiment through its precision: the presence and degree of random error/statistical uncertainty. The other kind of replication, which we call “conceptual replications,” principally serves to assess the validity of an experiment through its accuracy: the presence and degree of systematic errors/uncertainties. To illustrate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark