Informed by behavioral science research, recent defenses of paternalism point to people’s need for help in making and carrying out good decisions. Authors in this literature typically focus on defending paternalist policies against objections that frame them as threats to autonomy. But they often neglect a second category of objections to paternalism. Paternalism expresses disrespect not only for the target’s autonomy but also for her equal status. I argue that this second kind of wrong is more independent of autonomy-based objections (...) than has been recognized. Therefore, we need to evaluate paternalism in two dimensions, rather than treating egalitarian objections as a mere supplement to autonomy concerns. This allows us to see why welfare paternalism can be objectionable even when choices are not significantly constrained or when the choices at stake are relatively trivial. The barrier to justifiable welfare paternalist policies has less to do with the specific techniques of influence adopted than with their asymmetrical distribution and the inegalitarian structures through which they are delivered. (shrink)

The policy of earmarked paternity leave aims to promote mothers’ position in the labor market and fathers’ relationship with their child. Critics argue that the policy prevents parents from pursuing their own ideas about what is best for them. This provides reason to consider whether the policy is paternalistic or, in other ways, disrespectful of parental autonomy. I argue that the state implicates itself in the gender inequalities that result from parents’ unequal parental leave agreements when the state financially facilitates (...) such agreements. This argument for earmarked paternity leave is not disrespectful of parental autonomy. (shrink)

Liberal neutrality compels governments to respect individual preferences. Yet health-promotion campaigns, such as modern tobacco control policies, often seek to cultivate a preference for a healthy lifestyle. Liberal theorists have attempted to justify these policies by appealing to the concept of ‘means paternalism’, whereby these policies align with existing preferences. In contrast, this article argues that shaping preferences can be not only permissible but also morally required. Governments can preserve neutrality while influencing preferences by promoting generic goods valued in diverse (...) societies and considering the preference-formation of future generations. This argument provides a stronger rationale for tobacco control policies. (shrink)