The article aims to present issues arising out of differences in the way that the terms chimera and hybrid are defined in legal systems and by natural sciences in the context of mixing human and animal DNA. The author analyses the different approaches to defining these terms used in various legal systems, dividing them into groups in light of conclusions reached from examining definitions used in natural sciences. The distinction is used to answer the question of which approach to definitions (...) applied by legislators is the best way to handle the subject of human-animal organisms, given the need to balance their impact on medicine and the ethical concerns that arise. (shrink)

This paper explores the question of who is defined as a Native American within the jurisdictions of the United States. Determining individual status can be seen as a two-step process: Is a given individual recognized by a specific tribe as a member? Then, is that specific tribe acknowledged by a relevant governmental unit? Though both seem simple questions, this paper illustrates that the question “Is Person X a Native American?” sometimes can be quite fraught, and manifests what I have described (...) previously as definitional gaps and definitional ruptures. Ultimately, as is typical of regulatory definitions, the choice of definitional criteria to apply is a question of values, interests, and politics. I begin with a description of the varied definitional frameworks at work in determinations of whether a given group of people constitute a recognized tribe, then note how tribes themselves are institutions empowered to define who does or does not count as members through practices of enrollment and disenrollment. I then describe three case studies of definitional phenomena—one as a case of a definitional gap (college professors described as “Pretendians”), the second as a case of definitional rupture (determining Native American eligibility for free tuition within the University of California system), and a third as an illustration of regulatory versus self-definition (U.S. Census practices). (shrink)

The literature on argumentation and education often conveys that children’s argumentation skills are not well developed; therefore, it would be difficult to find argumentation in small children, as well as in primary school classrooms. However, studies focusing on argumentation in less formal contexts show that there is no need to depart from such a negative stance. If children are given room to pursue their lines of thought, they often produce sophisticated spontaneous argumentation. In this paper I consider arguments from definition (...) introduced by children as a case in point. To do so, I use a corpus of data, in which small children under the age of six years, discuss with an adult and with peers. Results show two uses of arguments from definition by children: on the one hand, children may introduce a new issue and their standpoint supported by an argument from definition; on the other hand, children may contest or refute an issue that was proposed by an adult and put forward an argument from definition. (shrink)