Studies of animal culture have not normally included a consideration of cetaceans. However, with several long-term field studies now maturing, this situation should change. Animal culture is generally studied by either investigating transmission mechanisms experimentally, or observing patterns of behavioural variation in wild populations that cannot be explained by either genetic or environmental factors. Taking this second, ethnographic, approach, there is good evidence for cultural transmission in several cetacean species. However, only the bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops) has been shown experimentally to (...) possess sophisticated social learning abilities, including vocal and motor imitation; other species have not been studied. There is observational evidence for imitation and teaching in killer whales. For cetaceans and other large, wide-ranging animals, excessive reliance on experimental data for evidence of culture is not productive; we favour the ethnographic approach. The complex and stable vocal and behavioural cultures of sympatric groups of killer whales (Orcinus orca) appear to have no parallel outside humans, and represent an independent evolution of cultural faculties. The wide movements of cetaceans, the greater variability of the marine environment over large temporal scales relative to that on land, and the stable matrilineal social groups of some species are potentially important factors in the evolution of cetacean culture. There have been suggestions of gene-culture coevolution in cetaceans, and culture may be implicated in some unusual behavioural and life-history traits of whales and dolphins. We hope to stimulate discussion and research on culture in these animals. (shrink)

This paper starts from the presupposition that moral codes often do not suffice to make agents understand their moral responsibility. We will illustrate this statement with a concrete example of engineers who design a truck’s trailer and who do not think traffic safety is part of their responsibility. This opinion clashes with a common supposition that designers in fact should do all that is in their power to ensure safety in traffic. In our opinion this shows the need for a (...) moral philosophy that helps engineers to interpret their responsibility and think more critically about it. For this purpose we will explore the moral philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre, which is particularly interesting because he locates the beginning of moral thinking in the daily practice of a profession. This is consistent with the history of moral codes, for codes are also the product of moral reflection by professionals. We will use MacIntyre’s philosophy to (1) explain what is wrong with the designers’ understanding of their responsibility and (2) show a possible way to bring their reflection to a more self-critical level. We will also inspect MacIntyre’s proposal critically. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to articulate a conception of emancipation for the Anthropocene. First, the Kantian roots of emancipation understood as the capacity of rational beings to act according to self-chosen ends are explained. It is shown that this conception of emancipation sets the realm of autonomous beings humans over the realm of heteronomous beings. Accounts of the ‘humanisation of nature’ are analysed as incomplete attempts to overcome this dualism. It is argued that the root of this incompleteness (...) lies in the application of analytical rather than dialectical reason to the human–nature interaction. The Anthropocene is presented as the geological–historical moment when at the same time as nature is being humanised, humans are being made aware of themselves as animal. This gives way to a conception of Anthropocene emancipation which will be described in a fourth section. The article concludes with reflections on COVID-19 as a ‘disease of the Anthropocene’ and as an opportunity reflexively, and at unprecedented scale, to internalise our heteronomy and to live an emancipation fit for a terraforming species. (shrink)

This essay has two purposes. One is to present a detailed analysis of a historical example to defend the validity of the idea of universal rationality. Although diverse arguments have been offered...

This thesis aims at formulating a human rights justification based on the assumption that disbelief in human rights is found in communicative grounds, rather than some sort of unreasonable evil. I first identify what I believe to be a flaw in the communicative strength of existing human rights justifications in explaining why rights should be. I suggest that there is a gap between the justifications of human rights that contain metaphysical narrative, and the justifications that rely on subjective experience of (...) rights as good. I further explain how this is a gap that political consensus and the idea of Kantian moral reason cannot seem to fill. I subsequently boil this gap down to the concept of value, since the foundation for each justification is based on a type of value. These are categorized as either given value – which applies to all attributes of value that is “given” to us independently of our actions or opinions, or created value – which applies to all attributes of value that stem from social interaction and experience. As justifications are funneled into either of these two categories of value, it begins to look like no other type of value exist, and as a result no one looks for it. To respond to this problem, I formulate a philosophical explanation, in Robert Nozicks terms. This explanation shows that there may be other routes to apply to value than sticking to simply given or created value. My explanation utilizes the three theories of philosophical anthropology, internal metaphysical realism and Wittgensteins philosophy of language, and it is based on the result of an analysis of material consisting of human rights justification arguments by Nicholas Wolterstorff, Alasdaire MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum and Richard Rorty. The actual philosophical explanation I formulate utilizes the metaphysics of Helen Steward to provide a given-value foundation for the primitive reactions of Stefan Eriksson, which creates value through social organization. Overall, I find that there are untried possibilities which may allow for a different type of value to act as the foundation for a human rights justification. My contribution to the field rests in the novelty of the theories used in my explanation, and the angle of the problem formulation. (shrink)

Plato’s philosophy of paideia concerns the life-long growth toward areté, excellence, in body, mind, and spirit. Implementation of this philosophy in modern times is challenged by many societal conditions, especially relativism, plurality, and secularity. This paper discusses an approach that advocates individualized paideia. In its most simple and direct manifestation, individualized paideia can be supported and developed by the person’s participation in a class of games exemplified by the Tibetan game Rebirth. An analysis of their structure and dynamics indicates that (...) these ‘R-type’ games promote embodied areté across a variety of paths. They meet the challenges of relativism, pluralism, and secularism, to provide scalable and transferable games of individualized paideia. (shrink)

Allyne L. Smith, Jr.; Personhood: Beginnings and Endings, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality, Volume 6, Issue 1, 1 January 2000, Pa.

“Incarnate reason” names, in Peter Dabrock's essay, both the task of utilizing natural reason in ethical and political discourse, and an answer to the ontological question about human persons, “What are we?” In this essay, I investigate the significance of this construal for questions about the metaphysical, moral, and political status of the human embryo.

Rescher is a key figure in ‘new American pragmatist philosophy’. His work shares many commonalities with critical realism and engaging with it is always a rewarding experience. In this paper I set out the key features of his work on evolution and intelligent design, Productive Evolution: On Reconciling Evolution with Intelligent Design, and then address the weaknesses in the argument. The central strength of the argument is its innovative approach to the meaning of intelligent design in its relation to evolution. (...) I use an analysis of the text to then consider what this suggests in terms of the nuance of immanent critique as realist concept. (shrink)

The essay discusses the nature of friendship and the role of parental love in the development of what Aristotle refers to as perfect friendship. I also conclude with some remarks regarding the influence of technology upon the significance of friendship.

While many scholars agree that the ‘‘separation thesis’’ (Freeman in Bus Ethics Quart 4(4):409–421, 1994)—that business issues and ethical issues can be neatly compartmentalized—is harmful to business ethics scholarship and practice, they also conclude that eliminating it is either inadvisable because of the usefulness of the positive/ normative distinction, or actually impossible. Based on an exploration of the fact/value dichotomy and the pragmatist and virtue theoretic responses to it, we develop an approach to eliminating the separation thesis that integrates ‘‘business’’ (...) with ‘‘ethics’’ while still permitting a positive/ normative distinction, which we call ‘‘ethics from observation.’’. (shrink)

This paper aims to show that by confronting the ethical alternatives proposed by Nietzsche and MacIntyre as resulting of their critical analyses of the modern moral condition respectively done in Genealogy of the Morals and After Virtue , we can find shared theoretical presumptions that point to those alternatives as convergent in many cases and not simply as excluding each other, even in a opposed direction to the MacIntyre’s point of view concerning that issue.