This article aims to delve into the theoretical perspective on imagination in education, focusing specifically on Imaginative Education theory. The approach involves a dual objective: critically analyzing the limitations and specific potentials of Imaginative Education to stimulate contemporary discourse on imagination in education and using it as a foundation to frame current research in philosophy and psychology within an educational context. Key elements of this theoretical operation include a critical examination of philosophical taxonomies on the concept of imagination and its (...) reinterpretation in relation to Predictive Coding and Embodied Cognition theories. The fundamental goal of this conceptual clarification goes beyond the theoretical realm. The article aspires to contribute to the growing interest in imagination, fantasy, and creativity as essential elements of curriculum design and teacher education, serving both as educational objectives and resources to create meaningful learning environments and experiences. Hence, the focus on the IE theory aims to bridge the gap between theoretical reflections on imagination and learning and their practical implications in curriculum design and teacher education or professional development. (shrink)

In this philosophical exploration, we investigate the concept of robotic moral environment interaction. The common view understands moral interaction to occur between agents endowed with ethical and interactive capacities. However, recent developments in moral philosophy argue that moral interaction also occurs in relation to the environment. Here conditions and situations of the environment contribute to human moral cognition and the formation of our moral experiences. Based on this philosophical position, we imagine robots interacting as moral environments—a novel conceptualization of human–robot (...) moral interaction with an inherent capacity for moral augmentation. To explicate this idea, we first define moral environments as moral systems providing moral affordances. We then intuit and explicate two constitutive conditions of moral environments: the environment’s moral ambiance and its moral atmosphere and compare them with real-life cases of moral environments—the moral landmarks. Based on these explications, we construct several explanatory cases to illustrate robots interacting as moral environments. Lastly, we set to evaluate the ethical challenges and wider social ramifications of using moral environment robots in the public space. (shrink)