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Grounding analog computers

Bruce J. MacLennan

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Hypercomputation and the Physical Church‐Turing Thesis.Paolo Cotogno - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):181-223.details A version of the Church-Turing Thesis states that every effectively realizable physical system can be simulated by Turing Machines (‘Thesis P’). In this formulation the Thesis appears to be an empirical hypothesis, subject to physical falsification. We review the main approaches to computation beyond Turing definability (‘hypercomputation’): supertask, non-well-founded, analog, quantum, and retrocausal computation. The conclusions are that these models reduce to supertasks, i.e. infinite computation, and that even supertasks are no solution for recursive incomputability. This yields that the realization (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 20 citations
No virtual mind in the chinese room.C. Kaernbach - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (11):31-42.details The Chinese room thought experiment of John Searle militates against strong artificial intelligence, illustrating his claim that syntactical knowledge by itself is neither constitutive nor sufficient for semantic understanding as found in human minds. This thought experiment was put to a behavioural test, concerning the syntax of a finite algebraic field. Input, rules and output were presented with letters instead of numbers. The set of rules was first presented as a table but finally internalized by the participants. Quite in line (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Transcending Turing computability.B. J. Maclennan - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (1):3-22.details It has been argued that neural networks and other forms of analog computation may transcend the limits of Turing-machine computation; proofs have been offered on both sides, subject to differing assumptions. In this article I argue that the important comparisons between the two models of computation are not so much mathematical as epistemological. The Turing-machine model makes assumptions about information representation and processing that are badly matched to the realities of natural computation (information representation and processing in or inspired by (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations
Computation and hypercomputation.Mike Stannett - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (1):115-153.details Does Nature permit the implementation of behaviours that cannot be simulated computationally? We consider the meaning of physical computation in some detail, and present arguments in favour of physical hypercomputation: for example, modern scientific method does not allow the specification of any experiment capable of refuting hypercomputation. We consider the implications of relativistic algorithms capable of solving the (Turing) Halting Problem. We also reject as a fallacy the argument that hypercomputation has no relevance because non-computable values are indistinguishable from sufficiently (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 6 citations
?Words lie in our way?Bruce J. MacLennan - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (4):421-37.details The central claim of computationalism is generally taken to be that the brain is a computer, and that any computer implementing the appropriate program would ipso facto have a mind. In this paper I argue for the following propositions: (1) The central claim of computationalism is not about computers, a concept too imprecise for a scientific claim of this sort, but is about physical calculi (instantiated discrete formal systems). (2) In matters of formality, interpretability, and so forth, analog computation and (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations

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