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  1. (Re)interpreting E=mc².Federico Benitez, Diego Romero-Maltrana & Pablo Razeto-Barry - 2022 - Foundations of Physics 52 (1):1-19.
    We propose a new interpretation of the equation E=mc² in special relativity by generalizing ideas of ontological emergence to fundamental physics. This allows us to propose that mass, as a property, can be considered to emerge from energy, using a well-known definition of weak ontological emergence. Einstein’s famous equation gains in this way a clearer philosophical interpretation, one that avoids the problems of previous attempts, and is fully consistent with the kinematic properties of special relativity, while yielding fresh insights concerning (...)
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  • Cognitivism and explanatory relativity.Jeffrey Hershfield - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):505-526.
    In much of his writing in the philosophy of mind, John Searle has been highly critical of what N. Block refers to as ‘The Computer Model of the Mind’ — the approach that treats the mind as a symbol-manipulating device akin in spirit, if not detail, to the modem computer. Searle refers to this philosophical approach as ‘cognitivism.’ The extent of his skepticism and animus toward the computer model of the mind is plainly apparent in the following quotation from Searle: (...)
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  • Beyond program explanation.Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald - 2007 - In Geoffrey Brennan (ed.), Common minds: themes from the philosophy of Philip Pettit. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 1--27.
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  • Pluralism, causation and overdetermination.Brian Jonathan - 1998 - Synthese 116 (3):355-378.
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  • The Freedom of Judgment.Mark Thomas Walker - 2003 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (1):63-92.
    This is the sequel to my paper 'Against One Form of Judgment-Determinism' ( IJPS , May 2001), wherein I argued that theoretical rationalization, that is, the forming of judgments by way of inference from other judgments, cannot simply be identified with any kind of predetermination of conclusion-judgments by premise-judgments. Taking 'free' to mean 'neither mechanistically explicable nor random' (where something is mechanistically explicable if and only if it is either predetermined or probabilified in a certain way, and is random if (...)
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