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Symbolic reasoning (IV.)

Mind 11 (43):352-368 (1902)

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  1. Russell and his sources for non-classical logics.Irving H. Anellis - 2009 - Logica Universalis 3 (2):153-218.
    My purpose here is purely historical. It is not an attempt to resolve the question as to whether Russell did or did not countenance nonclassical logics, and if so, which nonclassical logics, and still less to demonstrate whether he himself contributed, in any manner, to the development of nonclassical logic. Rather, I want merely to explore and insofar as possible document, whether, and to what extent, if any, Russell interacted with the various, either the various candidates or their, ideas that (...)
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  • A Formal Framework for Hypersequent Calculi and Their Fibring.Marcelo E. Coniglio & Martín Figallo - 2014 - In Arnold Koslow & Arthur Buchsbaum (eds.), The Road to Universal Logic: Festschrift for 50th Birthday of Jean-Yves Béziau, Volume I. New York: Springer. pp. 73-93.
    Hypersequents are a natural generalization of ordinary sequents which turn out to be a very suitable tool for presenting cut-free Gentzent-type formulations for diverse logics. In this paper, an alternative way of formulating hypersequent calculi (by introducing meta-variables for formulas, sequents and hypersequents in the object language) is presented. A suitable category of hypersequent calculi with their morphisms is defined and both types of fibring (constrained and unconstrained) are introduced. The introduced morphisms induce a novel notion of translation between logics (...)
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  • Russell and MacColl: Reply to Grattan-guinness, wolen ski, and read.Modal Logic - 2001 - Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):21-42.
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  • From Effect to Cause: Deductive Reasoning.Ricardo Tavares da Silva - 2019 - Kairos 22 (1):109-131.
    According to the traditional view, the following incompatibility holds true: in reasoning, either there is warrant (certainty) or there is novelty. If there is warrant, there is not novelty: that would be the case of deductive reasoning. If there is novelty, there is not warrant: that would be the case of inductive reasoning. Causal reasoning would belong to the second group because there is novelty and, therefore, there is not warrant in it. I argue that this is false: reasoning may (...)
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