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Family disputes over the diagnosis of brain death have caused much controversy in the bioethics literature over the conceptual validity of the brain death standard. Given the tenuous status of brain death as death, it is pragmatically fruitful to reframe intractable debates about the metaphysical nature of brain death as metalinguistic disputes about its conceptual deployment. This new framework leaves the metaphysical debate open and brings into focus the social functions that are served by deploying the concept of brain death. (...) |
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The mainstream concept of death—the biological one—identifies death with the cessation of an organism. In this article, I challenge the mainstream position, showing that there is no single well-established concept of an organism and no universal concept of death in biological terms. Moreover, some of the biological views on death, if applied in the context of bedside decisions, might imply unacceptable consequences. I argue the moral concept of death—one similar to that of Robert Veatch—overcomes such difficulties. The moral view identifies (...) |
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Declaration of cardiorespiratory death, as defined by the Uniform Determination of Death Act, requires irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory function. A physician’s ability to confidently declare death is paramount because death is both a biological and social construct, and can afford a dying patient the opportunity to be an organ donor via donation after circulatory death. Inconsistencies related to cardiorespiratory death and DCD include the specific language used in the UDDA, specifically the use of the word “irreversible”. Additionally, in (...) |
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Frank Miller and I recently argued that the common assertion that ‘brain dead’ patients merely appear to be alive, though in reality are dead, is false.1 This assertion relies on an inaccurate and overly simplistic understanding of the role of medical technology in the physiology of a ‘brain dead’ patient. In response, Symons and Chua endorsed our conclusions regarding the vital status of the ventilated ‘brain dead’ patient, and then pursued the question: what does this imply if we are to (...) |
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Efforts to revise the Uniform Determination of Death Act in order to align law with medical practice have failed. Medical practice must now align with the law. People who are not dead under the law that defines death should not be declared dead. There is no compelling reason to continue the practice of declaring legally living persons to be dead. |
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In “Does Controlled Donation after Circulatory Death Violate the Dead Donor Rule?” the authors maintain that compliance with the dead donor rule (DDR) does not require a valid determination of deat... |
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In their target article, Nielsen Busch and Mjaaland (2023) exhort us to stop “focus[ing] on the validity of the criteria for determination of [circulatory] death” and “instead [look at] DCD protoco... |
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