In the article Should rare diseases get special treatment? by Monica Q F de Magalhaes,1 it is argued that rarity is not a morally relevant feature to consider in prioritising treatment in healthcare, but severity is. A central conclusion in the article is that severity rather than prevalence should guide different cost-effectiveness thresholds. Hence, I take it, she answers no to the question in her own heading. I agree with all of this—and with most of her other arguments and conclusions (...) in the article—except for the clause ‘rather than prevalence’. For this reason, I find the article misses its’ mark. Let me explain by taking Sweden as an example. Sweden has a legally established ethics framework for priority setting in healthcare since 1997, comprising three principles: human-dignity principle, needs-solidarity principle and cost-effectiveness principle. The implication of these principles in practice is that the higher the severity—the higher the cost-effectiveness threshold acceptable.2 During the last 10 years or so, the highest accepted cost-effectiveness threshold for the most severe conditions have been in the order of €100 000/QALY. Until a few years ago rarity or prevalence was …. (shrink)

In June 2021, an 1856 British Guiana 1c magenta stamp sold for US$8.3m. It is the only known specimen of its kind in existence and on a gram-for-gram basis the most valuable item in the world. Clearly, in some spheres of human engagement, rarity carries a premium. Should this logic be applied in healthcare? Magalhaes thinks not.1 They explore the topic of whether pricing and reimbursement systems should give a premium to orphan drugs for rare diseases. They argue that rarity (...) is irrelevant to pharmaceutical policy on ethical grounds, and instead drug incentives should be prioritised by disease severity. At a time when incentives for orphan medicines are being revisited globally, Magalhaes is provoking an important discussion. The author seeks to disentangle the interwoven concepts of rarity, severity and unmet need that factor into decisions on orphan drug policy. They perhaps overstate the emphasis on rarity within existing regulatory and P&R frameworks. Yes, this is one of the criteria for orphan drug designation, but in payer systems rarity is seldom explicitly referenced. For example, of the five largest European countries, only the United Kingdom formally adjusts willingness-to-pay thresholds by prevalence. In contrast, concepts of severity and unmet need feature widely in global regulatory processes (eg, Breakthrough Therapy designation from …. (shrink)

The Danish healthcare system must meet the need for easy and equal access to healthcare for every citizen. However, investigations have shown unfair prioritization of cancer patients and unfair prioritization of resources for expensive medicines over care. What is needed are principles for proper prioritization. This article investigates whether American ethicists Tom Beauchamp and James Childress’s principle of justice may be helpful as a conceptual framework for reflections on prioritization of expensive biological therapies in the Danish healthcare system. We present (...) an empirical study exploring the principles for prioritizing new expensive biological therapies. This study includes qualitative interviews with key Danish stakeholders experienced in antibody therapy and prioritizing resources for expensive medicines. Beauchamp and Childress’s model only covers government-funded primary and acute healthcare. Based on the interviews, this study indicates that to be helpful in a Danish context this model should include equal access for citizens to government-funded primary and acute healthcare, costly medicine, and other scarce treatments. We conclude that slightly modified, Beauchamp and Childress’s principle of justice might be useful as a conceptual framework for reflections on the prioritization of expensive biological therapies in the Danish healthcare system. (shrink)