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  1. Democratic Deliberation as the Open-Ended Construction of Justice.Stefan Rummens - 2007 - Ratio Juris 20 (3):335-354.
    An analysis of the epistemological structure of democratic deliberation as a procedure in which legal norms are constructed reveals that deliberation combines procedural and substantive aspects in a unique and inextricable manner. The co-original recognition of the private and public autonomy of all citizens provides the substantive critical standard against which the justice of norms is measured. At the same time, such recognition requires that the particular needs and values of all people concerned be taken into account. Given the privileged (...)
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  • Debate: The co-originality of private and public autonomy in deliberative democracy.Stefan Rummens - 2006 - Journal of Political Philosophy 14 (4):469–481.
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  • Liberalism and the moral basis for human rights.Jon Mahoney - 2008 - Law and Philosophy 27 (2):151 - 191.
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  • Where the Right Gets in: On Rawls’s Criticism of Habermas’s Conception of Legitimacy.James Gordon Finlayson - 2016 - Kantian Review 21 (2):161-183.
    Many commentators have failed to identify the important issues at the heart of the debate between Habermas and Rawls. This is partly because they give undue attention to differences between Rawls’s original position and Habermas’s principle, neither of which is germane to the actual dispute. The dispute is at bottom about how best to conceive of democratic legitimacy. Rawls indicates where the dividing issues lie when he objects that Habermas’s account of democratic legitimacy is comprehensive and his is confined to (...)
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  • Moral Cognitivism and Legal Positivism in Habermas's and Kan't Philosophy of Law.Delamar José Volpato Dutra & Nythamar de Oliveira - 2017 - Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 16 (3):533-546.
    The hypothesis of this paper is that legal positivism depends on the non plausibility of strong moral cognitivism because of the non necessary connection thesis between law and morality that legal positivism is supposed to acknowledge. The paper concludes that only when based on strong moral cognitivism is it consistent to sustain the typical non-positivistic thesis of the necessary connection between law and morality. Habermas’s Philosophy of law is confronted with both positions.
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