Descriptions of bodies within the literature of the enactive approach to cognitive science exhibit an interesting dialectical tension. On the one hand, a body is considered to be a unity which instantiates an identity, forming an intrinsic basis for value. On the other, a living body is in a reciprocally defining relationship with the environment, and is therefore immersed and entangled with, rather than distinct from, its environment. In this paper I examine this tension, and its implications for the enactive (...) approach, particularly the enactive conceptions of life and bodies. Following the lead of others, I argue that enactive cognitive science can benefit from a deeper reading and integration with extant work on the complexity and multiplicity of the living body within feminist philosophy and feminist science studies. (shrink)

To better navigate social interactions, we routinely (consciously or unconsciously) categorize people based on their distinctive features. One important way we do this is by ascribing political orientations to them. For example, based on certain behavioral cues, we might perceive someone as politically liberal, progressive, conservative, libertarian, Marxist, anarchist, or fascist. Although such ascriptions may appear to be mere descriptions, I argue that they can have deeper, regulative effects on their targets, potentially politicizing and polarizing them in ways that remain (...) underexplored in research on political polarization. To capture this dynamic, I introduce the notion of ‘politicizing mindshaping,’ distinguish it from other types of politicization, and review evidence suggesting that politicizing mindshaping is likely common. Finally, I contend that the pernicious effects of politicizing mindshaping may currently be significantly underestimated. This is because, unlike in many other cases of social labeling, negativity in political labeling is, to some extent, widely tolerated – even encouraged – and largely unconstrained by social norms in democratic countries. (shrink)

I support much of Maiese and Hanna’s (M&H) account of the ways social institutions “mindshape” people’s cognition (values, meanings, affective framings, and habits of bodily comportment), and of the ways neoliberal individualism can be resisted and progressive social change can be enacted. But the overall approach can be augmented, I argue, if M&H would embrace an enactivist account of socially distributed and collective cognition, and action, in which cognitive systems include but are not limited to individuals. Complementing M&H’s focus on (...) top-down “repressive” forms of power, with also “ideological” forms of power that are distributed throughout social communities and their discursive practices, symbolic resources, and shared meanings would enable M&H to see not just top-down mindshaping by institutions, but also peer-to-peer mindshaping between members of distributed normative social practices. This analysis also entails that diverse institutions are often composed of many differing communities and practices, such that institutions are not wholly destructive and deforming nor wholly constructive and enabling. It also augments their largely top-down account of social change with the kinds of social change enacted through peer-to-peer interactions between members of different communities, whose iterated interactions over time embody competition (differing distributions of repressive and ideological power) between different normative communities with different practices, especially through heterodox communities of resistance, offering liberatory and “enabling” social practices as alternatives to dominant orthodox “deforming” social practices. (shrink)

There are two primary philosophical approaches to examining the relationship between human bodies and political bodies. The first, reflected in traditional political theory on the body politic, is concerned with the question of how individuals aggregate into functioning or malfunctioning collectives—how singular citizen bodies come to constitute wider political entities. The second approach, maturing later in 20th century social and political philosophy, considers the opposite relation: instead of evaluating how the body politic emerges from the bottom-up, it focuses on how (...) bodies become politicized from the top-down. This, more sociological, perspective explores how human bodies are disciplined and learn to self-discipline into particular physical forms and functions. Dominant ideologies can infiltrate the bodies of adherents, and the task of the social critic or political philosopher is to delineate how, why, where, and when political structures shape the minds and bodies of citizens, as well as whether the effects are coercive, destructive, or liberatory. I will argue that a political philosophy of mind cannot flourish without attention to the cognitive science of ideologies. Until recently there has been little serious dialogue between biology and political philosophy, partly due to disciplinary balkanization and mostly because of the infancy of empirical biopolitics, the science of how cognitive and neurobiological processes are molded by political ideologies. I will suggest that attending to the emerging science of ideological cognition can allow us to build a stronger, more compelling, and provocative thesis on the mind-shaping consequences of immersion in ideologies than is possible with conceptual tools alone. (shrink)

Although mental health professionals traditionally have been viewed as sole experts and decision-makers, there is increasing awareness that the experiential knowledge of former patients can make an important contribution to mental health practices. I argue that current patients likewise possess a kind of expertise, and that including them as active participants in diagnosis and treatment can strengthen their autonomy and allow them to build up important habits and skills. To make sense of these agential benefits and describe how patients might (...) act as co-regulators of a therapeutic encounter, I look to the enactivist notion of “participatory sensemaking”. (shrink)

In accordance with the constructive, enabling approach to responding to critical commentaries, we’ve identified eleven more-or-less distinct “worries” that the commentators have expressed about MBP, and have attributed each such worry to one or more of the commentators; correspondingly, we’ve responded to the worries one-by-one, by construing them as critical inputs to the work that we’ve been doing, both before and after the publication of MBP, for the purposes of grounding, elaborating, and extending that work toward The Shape of Lives (...) to Come project. Then, we conclude by briefly describing The Shape of Lives To Come project and how our commentators’ worries have made creative contributions to this new work-in-progress, by shaping our philosophical thinking in organic, generative ways. (shrink)

Enactive psychiatry challenges a traditional medical model and its guiding assumption that it is the source of mental disorder in the individual and their malfunctioning brain. Instead, it emphasizes that mental disorder is fully embodied and involves a disruption in the relationship between an agent and their world. Proponents have argued this enactive approach to psychiatry offers a way to view mental disorders in more holistic terms, recognize the role of social factors, and make psychiatric practices more just. However, critics (...) have argued that this approach (1) remains overly individualistic, (2) does not provide us with the means of critiquing problematic social norms, and (3) ends up unduly pathologizing neurodiversity. To address the first criticism, I discuss how the enactivist notion of mindshaping helps to make sense of the way in which sense-making is deeply socially embedded. To address the second criticism, I argue that social norms themselves can be “unhealthy” in the sense that they lack “adaptive openness” and make it difficult for diverse forms of life to flourish. To address the third charge, I argue that although enactivism pushes us to challenge a social model of disability, it is fully consistent with the neurodiversity movement’s practical and political aims. (shrink)

Situated affectivity investigates how natural, material, and social environmental structures, so-called ‘scaffolds,’ influence our affective life. Initially, the debate focused on user-resource-interactions, i.e., on cases where individuals (‘users’) actively structure the environment (‘resource’) in beneficial ways, setting up scaffolds that allow them to solve routine problems, modify their means of coping with challenges, or avail themselves of new affective competences. More recently, cases of mind invasion have captured philosophers’ attention where the ways others structure the environment affect, or invade, people’s (...) minds, typically without their awareness and with harmful consequences. This paper contributes to recent discussions about the variety of phenomena that can count as ‘scaffolded affectivity’ in general and ‘scaffolded affective harm’ in particular. It also addresses the emerging question of how harmful affective scaffolds can come to have a grip on people’s minds, despite their detrimental consequences. We first disentangle some misconceptions and illustrate how diverse (harmful) affective scaffolds can be. In contrast to recent approaches that have characterized scaffolds in largely descriptive terms, we then identify factors that can help explain why a given scaffold is effective in modifying people’s minds. We also try to shed light on why some agents and some social structures are especially likely to experience or cause scaffolded affective harm, respectively, by arguing that user-resource-interactions and mind invasions are not independent, but intimately intertwined and mutually reinforcing, especially in the digital domain. We conclude with a speculative suggestion for further research. (shrink)

Cognitive scaffolding is typically conceptualized in terms of environmental design which serves to offload, facilitate, or enhance the cognitive capacities of interacting agents. Recent contributions to the literature on scaffolding have noted that environmental design might likewise scaffold cognition in ways that undermine the interests of interactant agents—giving rise to notions of problematic or hostile scaffolding. Given the pervasiveness of social and technological scaffolding in contemporary life, the importance of understanding and assessing its effects can hardly be overstated. At the (...) same time, however, the very pervasiveness of scaffolding raises a challenge to the current criteria for evaluating its effects by comparison with agents’ interests. This is because human agents and their interests alike are themselves the results of various forms of social and technological scaffolding. This paper explores the relationship between scaffolding and the formation of agents along with their interests, as well as the implications of this relationship for evaluating scaffolding as being hostile, neutral, or beneficial. I will argue that the formative aspect of scaffolding imparts a degree of uncertainty to evaluations of scaffolding based on agents’ interests. I will then demonstrate the relevance of the formative aspect of scaffolding in evaluating and assessing the potentially pernicious effects of contemporary social and technological scaffolding focusing on the examples of servitization marketing models and social and vocational digital infrastructures. (shrink)

Where does enactivism fit on the question of realism or idealism for perception? In recent years all general positions have been argued to be adequate. I will argue that enactivism is neither realist nor idealist, and requires a completely different game altogether. In short: it is not idealist because it sees cognition as inherently world-involving, and isn’t realist because it emphasizes the agent’s role in shaping the world through our own historical, bodily activity. More generally, I argue that the question (...) itself assumes a reified, abstract notion of perception. This introduces a wedge between organism and environment that is incompatible with enactivism’s view of organism and environment as mutually constitutive. This problematizes the intermediate position between realist and idealist extremes as has traditionally been argued for in enactivism. I also touch on the ethical implications of this question, and how enactivism provides a promising path to grapple with the contradiction of the objective, shared space and our individual, historically shaped encounters with it. In sum, I suggest it is time for enactivism to go off the beaten path, and lay its own path in walking again. (shrink)

Luis H. Favela’s (2024) The ecological brain: Unifying the sciences of brain, body, and environment uses complex systems theory’s methods, concepts and theories to illustrate the possibility of integrating neuroscience with ecological psychology, in spite of the antipathy these fields ostensibly have for one another. While this “NeuroEcological Nexus Theory” (NExT) is a very promising framework to achieve this primary goal, I argue that it ultimately needs more than just Embodied, Embedded (or Ecological) cognition. Favela’s secondary goals of having “œbroad (...) applicability to other mind sciences” and eventually also explaining “real” cognition beyond perception-action coordination, can’t be achieved without incorporating the other aspects of so-called “E-Cognition”; especially Enactive and Extended/Extensive cognition. (shrink)