This paper addresses the question of whether large language model-powered chatbots are capable of assertion. According to what we call the Thesis of Chatbot Assertion (TCA), chatbots are the kinds of things that can assert, and at least some of the output produced by current-generation chatbots qualifies as assertion. We provide some motivation for TCA, arguing that it ought to be taken seriously and not simply dismissed. We also review recent objections to TCA, arguing that these objections are weighty. We (...) thus confront the following dilemma: how can we do justice to both the considerations for and against TCA? We consider two influential responses to this dilemma - the first appeals to the notion of proxy-assertion; the second appeals to fictionalism - and argue that neither is satisfactory. Instead, reflecting on the ontogenesis of assertion, we argue that we need to make space for a category of proto-assertion. We then apply the category of proto-assertion to chatbots, arguing that treating chatbots as proto-assertors provides a satisfactory resolution to the dilemma of chatbot assertion. (shrink)

Newly powerful large language models have burst onto the scene, with applications across a wide range of functions. We can now expect to encounter their outputs at rapidly increasing volumes and frequencies. Some commentators claim that large language models are bullshitting, generating convincing output without regard for the truth. If correct, that would make large language models distinctively dangerous discourse participants. Bullshitters not only undermine the norm of truthfulness (by saying false things) but the normative status of truth itself (by (...) treating it as entirely irrelevant). So, do large language models really bullshit? I argue that they can, in the sense of issuing propositional content in response to fact-seeking prompts, without having first assessed that content for truth or falsity. However, I further argue that they need not bullshit, given appropriate guardrails. So, just as with human speakers, the propensity for a large language model to bullshit depends on its own particular make-up. (shrink)

Conversational Artificial Intelligence (CAI) systems (also known as AI “chatbots”) are among the most promising examples of the use of technology in mental health care. With already millions of users worldwide, CAI is likely to change the landscape of psychological help. Most researchers agree that existing CAIs are not “digital therapists” and using them is not a substitute for psychotherapy delivered by a human. But if they are not therapists, what are they, and what role can they play in mental (...) health care? To answer these questions, we appeal to two well-established and widely discussed concepts: cognitive and affective artifacts. Cognitive artifacts are artificial devices contributing functionally to the performance of a cognitive task. Affective artifacts are objects which have the capacity to alter subjects’ affective state. We argue that therapeutic CAIs are a kind of cognitive-affective artifacts which contribute to positive therapeutic change by (i) simulating a (quasi-)therapeutic interaction, (ii) supporting the performance of cognitive tasks, and (iii) altering the affective condition of their users. This sheds new light on why virtually all existing mental health CAIs implement principles and techniques of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy — a therapeutic orientation according to which affective change and, ultimately, positive therapeutic change is mediated by cognitive change. Simultaneously, it allows us to conceptualize better the potential and limitations of applying these technologies in therapy. (shrink)

As technology improves, artificial systems are increasingly able to behave in human-like ways: holding a conversation; providing information, advice, and support; or taking on the role of therapist, teacher, or counsellor. This enhanced behavioural complexity, we argue, encourages deeper forms of affective engagement on the part of the human user, with the artificial agent helping to stabilise, subdue, prolong, or intensify a person’s emotional condition. Here, we defend a fictionalist account of human/AI interaction, according to which these encounters involve an (...) elaborate practise of imaginative pretence: a make-believe in which the artificial agent is attributed a life of its own. We attend, specifically, to the temporal characteristics of these fictions, and to what we imagine artificial agents are doing when we are not looking at them. (shrink)

Recently developed large language models (LLMs) perform surprisingly well in many language-related tasks, ranging from text correction or authentic chat experiences to the production of entirely new texts or even essays. It is natural to get the impression that LLMs know the meaning of natural language expressions and can use them productively. Recent scholarship, however, has questioned the validity of this impression, arguing that LLMs are ultimately incapable of understanding and producing meaningful texts. This paper develops a more optimistic view. (...) Drawing on classic externalist accounts of reference, it argues that LLM-generated texts meet the conditions of successful reference. This holds at least for proper names and so-called paradigm terms. The key insight here is that the LLM may inherit reference from its training-data through a reference-sustaining training mechanism. (shrink)

Artificially generated content threatens to seriously disrupt the public sphere. Generative AI massively facilitates the production of convincing portrayals of fabricated events. We have already begun to witness the spread of synthetic misinformation, political propaganda, and non-consensual intimate deepfakes. Malicious uses of the new technologies can only be expected to proliferate over time. In the face of this threat, social media platforms must surely act. But how? While it is tempting to think they need new sui generis policies targeting synthetic (...) content, we argue that the challenge posed by generative AI should be met through the enforcement of general platform rules. We demonstrate that the threat posed to individuals and society by AI-generated content is no different in kind from that of ordinary harmful content—a threat which is already well recognised. Generative AI massively increases the problem but, ultimately, it requires the same approach. Therefore, platforms do best to double down on improving and enforcing their existing rules, regardless of whether the content they are dealing with was produced by humans or machines. (shrink)