Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Impossibility in the Prior Analytics and Plato's dialectic.B. Castelnérac - 2015 - History and Philosophy of Logic 36 (4):303-320.
    I argue that, in the Prior Analytics, higher and above the well-known ‘reduction through impossibility’ of figures, Aristotle is resorting to a general procedure of demonstrating through impossibility in various contexts. This is shown from the analysis of the role of adunaton in conversions of premises and other demonstrations where modal or truth-value consistency is indirectly shown to be valid through impossibility. Following the meaning of impossible as ‘non-existent’, the system is also completed by rejecting any invalid combinations of terms (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Reply to Bronstein, Leunissen, and Beere.Marko Malink - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):748-762.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Proof by Assumption of the Possible in Prior Analytics, 1.15; How Not to Blend Modal Frameworks.Doukas Kapantais & George Karamanolis - 2020 - History and Philosophy of Logic 41 (3):203-216.
    The present paper aims to show that the reconstruction of the formal framework of the proofs in Pr. An. 1.15, as proposed by Malink and Rosen 2013 (‘Proof by Assumption of the Possible in Prior Analytics 1.15’, Mind, 122, 953-85) is due to affront a double impasse. Malink and Rosen argue convincingly that Aristotle operates with two different modal frameworks, one as found in the system of modal logic presented in Prior Analytics 1.3 and 8-22, and one occurring in many (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Aristotle's Proofs Through the Impossible in Prior Analytics 1.15.Riccardo Zanichelli - 2023 - History and Philosophy of Logic 44 (4):395-421.
    In Prior Analytics 1.15, Aristotle attempts to give a proof through the impossible of Barbara, Celarent, Darii, and Ferio with an assertoric first premiss, a contingent second premiss, and a possible conclusion. These proofs have been controversial since antiquity. I shall show that they are valid, and that Aristotle is able to explain them by relying on two meta-syllogistic lemmas on the nature of possibility interpreted as syntactic consistency. It will turn out that Aristotle's proofs are not of the intended (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark