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  1. Deliberative Clinical Ethics: Getting Back to Basics in the Work of Clinical Ethics and Clinical Ethicists.Laurence B. McCullough - 2014 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (1):1-7.
    The six papers in the 2014 clinical ethics number of the Journal get us back to the basics in the work of clinical ethics and clinical ethicists: getting clear about concepts that should be used in achieving deliberative clinical ethics. The papers explore the concepts of the best interests of the patient, health and disease understood in their proper relationship to autonomy in our species, the therapeutic obligation, and the therapeutic imperative. The final paper appraises the systematic review, a scholarly (...)
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  • La biología sintética y el imperativo de mejoramiento.Antonio Diéguez - 2016 - Isegoría 55:503.
    La biología sintética encierra un enorme potencial transformador de los organismos vivos, incluyendo en un futuro quizás no muy lejano la transformación del propio genoma humano. Son claras las conexiones que pueden establecerse entre este enorme potencial transformador y las pretensiones de los partidarios del biomejoramiento humano. La construcción de genomas completamente sintéticos puede cambiar de forma definitiva e irreversible aspectos fundamentales de la vida humana, quizás hasta el punto de dar lugar a un organismo que difiera de nuestra especie (...)
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  • Bioethics and Moral Agency: On Autonomy and Moral Responsibility.John Skalko & Mark J. Cherry - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (5):435-443.
    Two clusters of essays in this issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy provide a critical gaze through which to explore central moral, phenomenological, ontological, and political concerns regarding human moral agency and personal responsibility. The first cluster challenges common assumptions in bioethics regarding the voluntariness of human actions. The second set turns the debate towards morally responsible choice within the requirements of distributive justice. The force of their collective analysis leaves us with a well-founded basis critically to approach (...)
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  • Limits to human enhancement: nature, disease, therapy or betterment?Bjørn Hofmann - 2017 - BMC Medical Ethics 18 (1):56.
    New technologies facilitate the enhancement of a wide range of human dispositions, capacities, or abilities. While it is argued that we need to set limits to human enhancement, it is unclear where we should find resources to set such limits. Traditional routes for setting limits, such as referring to nature, the therapy-enhancement distinction, and the health-disease distinction, turn out to have some shortcomings. However, upon closer scrutiny the concept of enhancement is based on vague conceptions of what is to be (...)
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  • Upgrading Discussions of Cognitive Enhancement.Susan B. Levin - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (1):53-67.
    Advocates of cognitive enhancement maintain that technological advances would augment autonomy indirectly by expanding the range of options available to individuals, while, in a recent article in this journal, Schaefer, Kahane, and Savulescu propose that cognitive enhancement would improve it more directly. Here, autonomy, construed in broad procedural terms, is at the fore. In contrast, when lauding the goodness of enhancement expressly, supporters’ line of argument is utilitarian, of an ideal variety. An inherent conflict results, for, within their utilitarian frame, (...)
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  • Procreative Beneficence, Intelligence, and the Optimization Problem.Ben Saunders - 2015 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 40 (6):653-668.
    According to the Principle of Procreative Beneficence, reproducers should choose the child, of those available to them, expected to have the best life. Savulescu argues reproducers are therefore morally obligated to select for nondisease traits, such as intelligence. Carter and Gordon recently challenged this implication, arguing that Savulescu fails to establish that intelligence promotes well-being. This paper develops two responses. First, I argue that higher intelligence is likely to contribute to well-being on most plausible accounts. Second, I argue that, even (...)
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