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  1. How Helen Keller Used Syntactic Semantics to Escape from a Chinese Room.William J. Rapaport - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (4):381-436.
    A computer can come to understand natural language the same way Helen Keller did: by using “syntactic semantics”—a theory of how syntax can suffice for semantics, i.e., how semantics for natural language can be provided by means of computational symbol manipulation. This essay considers real-life approximations of Chinese Rooms, focusing on Helen Keller’s experiences growing up deaf and blind, locked in a sort of Chinese Room yet learning how to communicate with the outside world. Using the SNePS computational knowledge-representation system, (...)
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  • How to read minds.Tim Bayne - 2012 - In Sarah Richmond, Geraint Rees & Sarah J. L. Edwards (eds.), I know what you're thinking: brain imaging and mental privacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 41.
    Most animals have mental states of one sort or another, but few species share our capacity for self-awareness. We are aware of our own mental states via introspection, and we are aware of the mental states of our fellow human beings on the basis of what they do and say. This chapter is not concerned with these traditional forms of mind-reading—forms whose origins predate the beginnings of recorded history—but with the prospects of a rather different and significantly more recent form (...)
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  • Tacitness and virtual beliefs.Mark Crimmins - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (3):240-63.
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  • Concept individuation, possession conditions, and propositional attitudes.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Noûs 39 (1):140-66.
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  • How minds can be computational systems.William J. Rapaport - 1998 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 10 (4):403-419.
    The proper treatment of computationalism, as the thesis that cognition is computable, is presented and defended. Some arguments of James H. Fetzer against computationalism are examined and found wanting, and his positive theory of minds as semiotic systems is shown to be consistent with computationalism. An objection is raised to an argument of Selmer Bringsjord against one strand of computationalism, namely, that Turing-Test± passing artifacts are persons, it is argued that, whether or not this objection holds, such artifacts will inevitably (...)
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  • It's hard to believe.J. Christopher Maloney - 1990 - Mind and Language 5 (2):122-48.
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