Abstract This paper is a classic critique of speculative philosophies of history based on Maurice Mandelbaum's work. Unlike the more famous invective by Karl Popper, I argue that Mandelbaum's is a richer and more interesting approach, which reveals through exposition a deeper unity to Mandelbaum's work than is normally evident. Because Popper's nominalism is suspicious of all metaphysics, it loses credibility whereas Mandelbaum placed reflection on the nature of society and causality at the center of his interests. Mandelbaum's critique then (...) is an invitation to investigate metaphysics on realist principles and he requires that we have a robust theory of historical ontology and truth with which to judge what goes beyond the proper representation of history and becomes speculative. (shrink)

According to Sir Karl Popper, there is a harmful approach to the social sciences called 'historicism'. This takes their principal aim to be historical prediction of an unconditional sort and the chief means to this the discovery of laws of historical development. The chief exemplar is held to be Marx. This paper distinguishes two possible sorts of laws of historical development. Popper's arguments against each are rejected. Which sort it is most plausible to ascribe to Marx is considered. Four models (...) of historical determinism are distinguished and the question of Marx's view or views on the question is discussed in terms of them. (shrink)