This article seeks to point out that, the inclusion of a theological term - that is 'reconciliation' to what was supposed to be the 'Truth Commission' - was for the purpose of taming the work of this commission and using reconciliation to merely reach some political accommodation which did not address the critical questions of justice, equality, and dignity which are prominent in the biblical understanding of reconciliation. However, it is important to point out that, the problem was not the (...) theological word - that is 'reconciliation'- but the understanding and interpretation of it in South Africa. This is because previously in South Africa the Bible was made a servant to ideology and thus domesticated for the purposes of subjection and control. As such, this article contends that, the call for the inclusion of 'reconciliation' within the 'truth commission' was not to allow reconciliation to confront the country with the demands of the gospel but to blunt the process of radical change. Therefore, this article will point out that the shortcomings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission need to be understood against the following events which occurred between the period 1989 to 1995: the fall of the Soviet Union ; the National Party's and South African business sector's interest in negotiations with the African National Congress ; the elite compromise ; and the sudden passing of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, no 34 of 1995. This paper will use the story of Zacchaeus to contend that the TRC should have allowed Zacchaeus to testify in order to hear from him what reconciliation means. This is because, on the one hand, this commission made an extraordinary move when it appointed a Christian priest, namely Desmond Tutu, as its chair and on the other hand, the chair - that is Desmond Tutu - made another extraordinary move when he Christianised the whole process of this commission when he opened most of the sessions with prayer, invoking the name of Jesus Christ, and inviting the Holy Spirit to guide the proceedings of this commission. However this commission invoked the name of Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit for the purpose of forgiveness but ignored what Jesus Christ is asking in terms of justice which is clearly illustrated in the Story of Zacchaeus. Therefore, this article will argue that if Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit were invited into the processes of this commission, then Zacchaeus too should have been allowed to testify - so to say. (shrink)

This article focuses on the most recent debates in a certain area of the ‘law and emotion’ field, namely the literature on the role of affect in the criminal law. Following the dominance of cognitivism in the philosophy of emotions, authors moved away from seeing emotions as contaminations on reason and examined how affective reactions could be accommodated within penal proceedings. The review is structured into two main components. I look first at contributions about the multi-dimensional presence of emotions within (...) ordinary criminal proceedings. Second, I examine work done on the use of criminal trials under the emotionally stressful circumstances of post-conflict societies. In the conclusion I sketch a theoretical proposal for moving the discussion forward. (shrink)

The paper seeks to contribute to the transitional justice literature by overcoming the Democracy v. Justice debate. This debate is normatively implausible and prudentially self-defeating. Normatively, transitional justice will be conceptualised as an imperative of democratic equal concern. Prudentially, it can prevent further violence and provide an opportunity for initiating processes of democratic emotional socialisation. The resentment and indignation animating transitions should be acknowledged as markers of a sense of justice. As such, they can help the reproduction of democracy. However, (...) their public expression must be institutionally filtered through democratic norms. The consistent institutional instantiation of equal respect can educate and recuperate negative emotions for democracy. (shrink)

Processes of transitional justice deal with large-scale wrongdoing committed during extended periods of conflict or repression. This paper discusses three common moral objections to processes of transitional justice, which I label shaking hands with the devil, selling victims short, and entrenching the status quo. Given the scale of wrongdoing and the context in which transitional justice processes are adopted, compromise is necessary. To respond to these objections, I argue, it is necessary to articulate the conditions that make a compromise principled. (...) I defend three criteria that distinguish principled from unprincipled compromises. (shrink)