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Anscombe and The Difference Rationality Makes

In Adrian Haddock & Rachael Wiseman, The Anscombean Mind. New York, NY: Routledge (2021)

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  1. (1 other version)Are humans the only rational animals?Giacomo Melis & Susana Monsó - 2023 - The Philosophical Quarterly (3):844-864.
    While growing empirical evidence suggests a continuity between human and non-human psychology, many philosophers still think that only humans can act and form beliefs rationally. In this paper, we challenge this claim. We first clarify the notion of rationality. We then focus on the rationality of beliefs and argue that, in the relevant sense, humans are not the only rational animals. We do so by first distinguishing between unreflective and reflective responsiveness to epistemic reasons in belief formation and revision. We (...)
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  • (1 other version)Action.George Wilson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    If a person's head moves, she may or may not have moved her head, and, if she did move it, she may have actively performed the movement of her head or merely, by doing something else, caused a passive movement. And, if she performed the movement, she might have done so intentionally or not. This short array of contrasts (and others like them) has motivated questions about the nature, variety, and identity of action. Beyond the matter of her moving, when (...)
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  • Beginning at the beginning: predictive processing and coupled representations.Joshua Rust - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    A typical expository strategy for the predictive processing account begins with perception and then extends to other cognitive domains, such as action or non-human animal cognition. Because this standard, perception-first expository strategy begins at the end of an evolutionary process, it may introduce both diachronic and synchronic distortions into the overall account. As far as the diachronic distortion is concerned, because the perception-first strategy presupposes a highly decoupled cognitive architecture, it invites us to project this architecture onto the coupled cognitive (...)
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  • A Powers Framework for Mental Action.Seth Goldwasser - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Mental actions are things we do with our minds. Consider inferring, deliberating, imagining, remembering, calculating, and so on. I introduce a non-reductive alternative to standard causalist accounts of mental action that understands such action in terms of dispositions for performing mental actions. I call this alternative the powers framework. On the powers framework, habitual and skillful mental actions are themselves infused with practical intelligence by being expressions of the agent’s rational tendencies and capacities, respectively. The intelligence exemplified in the performance (...)
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