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  1. Positivism, Legal Validity, and the Separation of Law and Morals.Giorgio Pino - 2014 - Ratio Juris 27 (2):190-217.
    The essay discusses the import of the separability thesis both for legal positivism and for contemporary legal practice. First, the place of the separability thesis in legal positivism will be explored, distinguishing between “standard positivism” and “post‐Hartian positivism.” Then I will consider various kinds of relations between law and morality that are worthy of jurisprudential interest, and explore, from a positivist point of view, what kind of relations between law and morality must be rejected, what kind of such relations should (...)
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  • Law as justice.Michael S. Moore - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (1):115-145.
    A perennial question of jurisprudence has been whether there is a relationship between law and morality. Those who believe that there is no such relationship are known as while those who hold that some such relationship exists are usually tagged with the label Unfortunately, the latter phrase has been used in quite divergent senses. Sometimes it is used to designate any objectivist position about morality; as often, it labels the view that human nature determines what is objectively good or right; (...)
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  • On law and legal reasoning.Fernando Atria Lemaître - 2001 - Portland, Or.: Hart.
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  • Symmetry and interpretation: a deliberative framework for judging recognition claims.Diana Elena Popescu - 2024 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 27 (7):1204-1227.
    Can recognition theories distinguish legitimate from illegitimate claims to recognition put forward by social movements? This paper identifies an under-theorised problem of recognition theories: in viewing struggles for recognition as a force for social progress in the mould of the New Social Movements of the 1960s and 1970s, existing accounts have trouble identifying and ruling out illegitimate claims to recognition as formulated by contemporary counter-movements like white supremacists or men’s rights activists. I refer to this issue as the symmetry problem (...)
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  • What the legislature did not say.Damiano Canale & Giovanni Tuzet - 2016 - Journal of Argumentation in Context 5 (3):249-270.
    The paper is about the uses of the argument from legislative counterfactual intention, in the field of legal interpretation and argumentation. After presenting the argument from intention in general, it distinguishes the varities of the argument from counterfactual legislative intention and discusses their justification conditions.
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  • Judicial Practical Reason: Judges in Morally Imperfect Legal Orders.Anthony R. Reeves - 2011 - Law and Philosophy 30 (3):319-352.
    I here address the question of how judges should decide questions before a court in morally imperfect legal systems. I characterize how moral considerations ought inform judicial reasoning given that the law may demand what it has no right to. Much of the large body of work on legal interpretation, with its focus on legal semantics and epistemology, does not adequately countenance the limited legitimacy of actual legal institutions to serve as a foundation for an ethics of adjudication. I offer (...)
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  • Legal Authority and the Dead Hand of the Past. Dworkin's Law's Empire and Plato's Laws on Legal Normativity.Andrés Rosler - 2022 - Ancient Philosophy Today 4 (Supplement):45-65.
    According to Ronald Dworkin's mature views on jurisprudence, legal normativity depends on judges’ views about political morality. Plato's own mature views on this subject seem to take the contrary position as he claims that the law is expected to be authoritative in order to preserve a given state of affairs. Therefore, in Plato's view judges are not expected to interpret the law ubiquitously according to their own standards of political morality. In what follows, the discussion starts off by offering a (...)
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  • Authorities and Persons.Andrei Marmor - 1995 - Legal Theory 1 (3):337-359.
    In this article I want to support a certain conception of legal authority. The question I want to address is this: Is it possible to attribute legal authority to a given norm if its authority does not derive from the authority of someone who has issued that norm? Basically, I will try to defend here a negative answer to this question, espousing a personal conception of authority.
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  • Liability for Animals: An Historico-Structural Comparison. [REVIEW]Bernard S. Jackson - 2011 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 24 (3):259-289.
    This account of civil liability for animals in a range of ancient, mediaeval and modern legal systems (based on a series of studies conducted early in my career: (s.1)) uses semiotic analysis to supplement the insights of conventional legal history, thus balancing diachronic and synchronic approaches. It reinforces the conventional historical sensitivity to anachronism in two respects: (1) (logical) inference of underlying values from concrete rules (rather than attending to literary features of the text) manifests cognitive anachronism, an issue manifest (...)
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  • The pragmatics of legal language.Andrei Marmor - 2008 - Ratio Juris 21 (4):423-452.
    The purpose of this essay is to explore some of the main pragmatic aspects of communication within the legal context. It will be argued that in some crucial respects, the pragmatics of legal language is unique, involving considerations that are not typically present in ordinary conversational contexts. In particular, certain normative considerations that are typically settled in a regular conversational context are unresolved and potentially contentious in the legal case. On the other hand, the essay also argues that a careful (...)
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  • Legislative Intentions and Counterfactu‐als: Or, What One Can Still Learn from Dworkin's Critique of Legal Positivism.Damiano Canale & Giovanni Tuzet - 2023 - Ratio Juris 36 (1):26-47.
    Riggs v. Palmerhas become famous since Dworkin used it to show that legal positivism is defective. The debate over the merits of Dworkin's claims is still very lively. Yet not enough attention has been paid to the fact that the content of the statute at issue inRiggswas given by thecounterfactual intentionof the legislature. According to arguments from legislative intent, a judicial decision is justified if it is based on the lawmaker's intention. But can legislative intentions be determined counterfactually? More generally, (...)
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  • Marmor on Meaning, Interpretation, and Legislative Intention.Jeffrey Goldsworthy - 1995 - Legal Theory 1 (4):439-464.
    In his recent book Interpretation and Legal Theory , Andrei Marmor makes a number of claims about meaning and interpretation, both in general and in law, which I will argue are mistaken. Actually, there is some confusion in his book between what I take to be his “official” view of the nature of meaning and interpretation, and a very different view which keeps surfacing despite his official rejection of it. I will argue that this alternative, rejected view, when properly developed, (...)
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  • (1 other version)On Legal Inferentialism. Toward a Pragmatics of Semantic Content in Legal Interpretation?Damiano Canale & Giovanni Tuzet - 2007 - Ratio Juris 20 (1):32-44.
    In this paper we consider whether a pragmatics of semantic content can be a useful approach to legal interpretation. More broadly speaking, since a pragmatic conception of meaning is a component of inferential semantics, we consider whether an inferentialist approach to legal interpretation can be useful in dealing with some problems of this important aspect of law. In other words, we ask whether Legal Inferentialism is a suitable conception for legal interpretation. In Section 1 we briefly consider the semantics/pragmatics debate (...)
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  • Joseph Raz’s Theory of Authority. [REVIEW]Kenneth Ehrenberg - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (12):884-894.
    Joseph Raz’s theory of authority has become influential among moral, political, and legal philosophers. This article will provide an overview and accessible explanation of the theory, guiding those coming to it for the first time as to its theoretical ambitions within the wider issues of authority, and through its intricacies. I first situate the theory among philosophical examinations of authority, and then explain the theory itself in detail.
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  • La teoría “dworkiniana” del razonamiento jurídico de Jeremy Waldron: el eslabón ignorado.Javier Gallego Saade - 2019 - Isonomía. Revista de Teoría y Filosofía Del Derecho 50:6-48.
    En este trabajo se sostiene que la teoría del derecho iberoamericana ha malinterpretado la teoría del razonamiento jurídico de Jeremy Waldron, presentándola como una teoría formalista de la adjudicación, y a Waldron como un positivista excluyente. Esto se debe a una lectura sesgada de su teoría del derecho, que se explica, a su vez, por la imagen que el constitucionalismo ha construido en torno a Waldron, como un opositor de Dworkin. Este trabajo muestra que Waldron suscribe a una teoría “dworkiniana” (...)
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  • Political Representation as Interpretation: A Contribution to Deliberative Constitutionalism.Donald Bello Hutt - 2020 - Ratio Juris 33 (4):351-367.
    This article analogises political representation to legal interpretation. It then applies the analogy to the hitherto neglected question of what political representation means for deliberative constitutionalism. The upshot is a conception of deliberative constitutionalism that, while uncompromisingly grounded in the reasoned expression of the preferences of a polity's constituents through deliberative democratic institutional innovations, mandates representatives to translate those preferences into general and abstract constitutional law. It thus enhances the deliberative contribution of citizens in the determination of constitutional meaning, while (...)
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  • The Derivational Theory of Legal Interpretation in Polish Legal Theory.Olgierd Bogucki - 2020 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 33 (3):617-636.
    The article presents so-called “derivational” theory of legal interpretation and analyzes its basic assumptions. The derivational theory of legal interpretation is still little known outside of Poland. The article is divided into two parts. The first part is presenting the normative model of legal interpretation according to the derivational theory. In the second part, the basic assumptions and features of the theory are analysed in context of some other approaches to legal interpretation. The author argues that there are two levels (...)
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  • Authority, Equality and Democracy.Andrei Marmor - 2005 - Ratio Juris 18 (3):315-345.
    . The purpose of this essay is to argue that considerations of fairness play an essential role in the justification of democratic decision procedures. The first part argues that considerations of fairness form part of a practical authority's legitimacy, and that in the political context, those considerations of fairness entail a principle of equal distribution of political power. Subsequently, the article elaborates on the kind of equality which is required in democratic procedures, arguing that different principles of equality should apply (...)
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  • Principle, Discretion, and Symbolic Power in Rousseau's Account of Judicial Virtue.Eoin Daly - 2016 - Ratio Juris 29 (2):223-245.
    Rousseau's understanding of legislation as the expression of the general will implies a constitutional principle of legislative supremacy. In turn, this should translate to a narrow, mechanical account of adjudication, lest creative judicial interpretation subvert the primacy of legislative power. Yet in his constitutional writings, Rousseau recommends open-textured and vague legislative codes, which he openly admits will require judicial development. Thus he apparently trusts a great deal in judicial discretion. Ostensibly, then, he overlooks the problem of how legislative indeterminacy—and correspondingly, (...)
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  • Practical Reason and Legality: Instrumental Political Authority Without Exclusion.Anthony R. Reeves - 2015 - Law and Philosophy 34 (3):257-298.
    In a morally non-ideal legal system, how can law bind its subjects? How can the fact of a norm’s legality make it the case that practical reason is bound by that norm? Moreover, in such circumstances, what is the extent and character of law’s bindingness? I defend here an answer to these questions. I present a non-ideal theory of legality’s ability to produce binding reasons for action. It is not a descriptive account of law and its claims, it is a (...)
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  • Jurisprudence and Communication: Secular and Religious.Bernard S. Jackson - 2014 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 27 (3):463-484.
    In considering Van Schooten’s study of the Eric O. case (s.1), I ask whether the different approaches taken by the two different “legal institutions”—the prosecuting authorities on the one hand, the courts on the other—are reflective of different images of warfare (a semantic difference) or of the different images each group holds of its own role (a pragmatic difference). If we consider these two “legal institutions” as distinct semiotic groups (s.2), is there an inevitable “communication deficit” between them (and the (...)
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  • How a statute applies.Barbara Baum Levenbook - 2006 - Legal Theory 12 (1):71-112.
    This essay presents a new theory of statutory application that is superior to two competitors. One of the competitors claims that statutory directives apply to act-tokens fitting the legislature's intention. The other holds that statutes apply to act-tokens that are of the genuine kinds named by the classifying words. These theories solve certain problems badly or not at all, respectively: (1) accounting for the capacity of statutes for epistemic guidance; and (2) avoiding literalism. Both do a limited job of accounting (...)
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  • The Various Relations between Law and Morality in Contemporary Legal Philosophy.Michael S. Moore - 2012 - Ratio Juris 25 (4):435-471.
    This paper is intended to be a summary of the author's views on the relationship between law and morality worked out over the past three decades in jurisprudence. The paper preliminarily clarifies the matter by isolating some lines of cleavage separating different questions askable about this relationship. With this done, the author argues for two theses. One, that judges are obligated to use morality in their decisions in particular cases; and two, that the morality judges are obligated to use in (...)
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  • (1 other version)On Legal Inferentialism. Toward a Pragmatics of Semantic Content in Legal Interpretation?Giovanni Tuzet Damiano Canale - 2007 - Ratio Juris 20 (1):32-44.
    In this paper we consider whether a pragmatics of semantic content can be a useful approach to legal interpretation. More broadly speaking, since a pragmatic conception of meaning is a component of inferential semantics, we consider whether an inferentialist approach to legal interpretation can be useful in dealing with some problems of this important aspect of law. In other words, we ask whether Legal Inferentialism is a suitable conception for legal interpretation. In Section 1 we briefly consider the semantics/pragmatics debate (...)
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  • Recognizing cited facts and principles in legal judgements.Olga Shulayeva, Advaith Siddharthan & Adam Wyner - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (1):107-126.
    In common law jurisdictions, legal professionals cite facts and legal principles from precedent cases to support their arguments before the court for their intended outcome in a current case. This practice stems from the doctrine of stare decisis, where cases that have similar facts should receive similar decisions with respect to the principles. It is essential for legal professionals to identify such facts and principles in precedent cases, though this is a highly time intensive task. In this paper, we present (...)
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  • A theory of legislation from a systems perspective.Peter Harrison - unknown
    In this thesis I outline a view of primary legislation from a systems perspective. I suggest that systems theory and, in particular, autopoietic theory, as modified by field theory, is a mechanism for understanding how society operates. The description of primary legislation that I outline differs markedly from any conventional definition in that I argue that primary legislation is not, and indeed cannot be, either a law or any of the euphemisms that are usually accorded to an enactment by a (...)
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  • On convention.Andrei Marmor - 1996 - Synthese 107 (3):349 - 371.
    Following the pioneering work of David Lewis, many philosophers believe that the rationale of following a convention consists in the fact that conventions are solutions to recurrent coordination problems. Margaret Gilbert has criticised this view, offering an alternative account of the nature of conventions and their normative aspect. In this paper I argue that Gilbert's criticism of Lewis and her alternative suggestions rest on serious misunderstandings. As between these two opposed views, Lewis's is closer to the truth, but I argue (...)
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  • Defeasibility, Law, and Argumentation: A Critical View from an Interpretative Standpoint.Francesca Poggi - 2020 - Argumentation 35 (3):409-434.
    The phenomenon of defeasibility has long been a central theme in legal literature. This essay aims to shed new light on that phenomenon by clarifying some fundamental conceptual issues. First, the most widespread definition of legal defeasibility is examined and criticized. The essay shows that such a definition is poorly constructed, inaccurate and generates many problems. Indeed, the definition hides the close relationship between legal defeasibility and legal interpretation. Second, this essay argues that no new definition is needed. I will (...)
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  • Sources of Law Are not Legal Norms.Fábio Perin Shecaira - 2015 - Ratio Juris 28 (1):15-30.
    Anglo-American authors have paid little attention to a subtle distinction that has important jurisprudential implications. It is the distinction between sources of law and the legal norms which can be derived from sources by means of interpretation. The distinction might also be rendered as a threefold one, separating sources of law from legal norms and both of these from that which mediates their relation, namely, methods of legal interpretation. This paper intends to state the “source-norm” distinction clearly and to give (...)
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