In this paper, we provide an overview of the main stages in the development of Edmund Husserl’s conception of metaphysics, highlighting its most significant characteristics. We propose that Husserl’s views on metaphysics traversed three main stages: (1) from the early 1890s until his so-called “transcendental turn” around 1906/07; (2) from his transcendental turn until the late 1920s, and (3) the metaphysical conceptualization during the 1930s, aptly characterized as—following the interpretation of László Tengelyi—a “metaphysics of primal facts” (Urfakta, Urtatsache). We further (...) demonstrate that Husserl’s considerations concerning metaphysics—throughout his entire opus—span three essential levels: (1) the epistemological level, in particular, phenomenological preparations to establish a foundation for metaphysics; (2) a level concerning metaphysics as the universal and ultimate science of reality, and (3) a level addressing metaphysics as a proper field of phenomenological investigations into the highest and ultimate questions (such as God and immortality). We argue in detail that Husserl attempted to render this field—which radically transcends the domain of possible intuitions (Anschauungen) and direct experience—accessible to a legitimate phenomenological treatment via the method of phenomenological constructions, prior to the efforts of Eugen Fink. (shrink)