This article argues that sustainability is essentially a contested concept that not only cannot be sufficiently defined in a one-forall blueprint, but requires a new mode of self-actualization of human potential in dialogical, cooperative learning processes. Inherent aporias and their ethical implications are illustrated by an analysis of the mainstream interpretation of the sustainability concept in the context of the relationship between the logic of accumulation and improvement and insatiable human desires as off-springs of a deeper ontological transformation of modernity. (...) A philosophical account of technology and modern sciencewill be introduced in order to investigate overconsumption driven by mimetic desires and the transformative and dialectic dynamics of desire. A contemplative learning model is suggested as a useful basis for a reasonable interpretation of the sustainability concept. (shrink)

Hoping is an integral part of what it is to be human, and its significance for education has been widely noted. Hope is, however, a contested category of human experience and getting to grips with its characteristics and dynamics is a difficult task. The paper argues that hope is not a singular undifferentiated experience and is best understood as a socially mediated human capacity with varying affective, cognitive and behavioural dimensions. Drawing on the philosophy, theology and psychology of hope, five (...) modes of hoping are outlined: patient, critical, sound, resolute and transformative. The key aim of the paper is to illustrate how different modes of hoping are associated with different pedagogical strategies. Phrased differently, the paper seeks to delineate a range of pedagogies of hope. The phrase ‘pedagogy of hope’ is very much associated with critical theory—one thinks instantly of, for example, Paulo Freire, Henry Giroux or bell hooks. There are many pedagogies of hope, however, and an explicitly conservative text such as William Bennett’s Book of Virtues has as strong a claim to the title as Freire’s radical and utopian ideas. A broader argument, therefore, is that there is nothing inherently radical or subversive about a pedagogy of hope. Pedagogies of hope can serve to reproduce social relations as well as to transform them. (shrink)

Over the last 20 years, there has been an increase in philosophical inquiries of hope both in philosophy of mind and of virtue as well as in the philosophy of education. This paper wishes to add to this discussion by presenting the analysis of hope by French existentialist philosopher and theologian Gabriel Marcel and examining its possible contribution to educational practices and beliefs. As one of the very few modern, systematic accounts of hope, Marcel’s provocative conception of it and his (...) critique of its common “technical” use could prove promising when applied to educational theory and practice. Following Marcel, I argue that in hope we find a complex and possibly contradictory view of the future: as a result of planning and technical problem-solving on one hand, and on the other, as an inclination towards the mysterious and radically unexpected. I suggest that maintaining educational hope within the tension between the planned and the unexpected, and specifically rejecting a complete disenchantment of the educational act, could help in securing education from being reduced to instrumental training and socializing, opening it up to new and unimaginable possibilities. (shrink)

The author makes an introduction to non-standard analysis, then extends the dialectics to “neutrosophy” – which became a new branch of philosophy. This new concept helps in generalizing the intuitionistic, paraconsistent, dialetheism, fuzzy logic to “neutrosophic logic” – which is the first logic that comprises paradoxes and distinguishes between relative and absolute truth. Similarly, the fuzzy set is generalized to “neutrosophic set”. Also, the classical and imprecise probabilities are generalized to “neutrosophic probability”.

As a practicing physician (psychiatrist), scientist (neurologist) and philosopher, Erwin Straus developed a body of writing which, falling within the phenomenological tradition, is highly original and insightful. His unusual combination of work from these three areas constitutes one of the most important attempts to provide what has been called a new Paideia. Regarding this unique blend of perspectives and concerns as quite natural, he conceived his work variously as a medical anthropologyrdquo; or phenomenological psychology. In the end, he was both (...) a pioneer and a rebel: starting from psychiatry, he proceeded boldly straight into phenomenological philosophy, illuminating significant aspects of human life: if we would understand the norm, we must begin with the disruptions, as failures of existential projects; that is, as forms of human life - which was ultimately at the heart of his life-long epistemic and therapeutic concerns. (shrink)

This article examines the compatibility and relevance of Gabriel Marcel’s phenomenology of hope in interdisciplinary research on the role of hope in end-of-life care. Our analysis is divided into three thematic topics which examine the various shades of hope observed in Marcel’s phenomenology of hope and in the collection of 20 EOL studies on hope as experienced by adult palliative care patients, health care professionals and parents of terminally ill children. The three topics defining the shades of hope are: the (...) meaning of hope in its dynamic aspects, the dialectics of hope and despair, and the transcendent facets of hope. We analyse how Marcel’s understanding of hope is reflected in EOL studies, and how this perception can enrich the philosophy of PC and significantly deepen and broaden HCPs’ understanding of hope. Our findings prove that despite terminological differences between Marcelian phenomenology and the concepts of hope in the 20 EOL studies, hope emerges as a resourceful movement towards being. Implementing Marcelian hope within communication in EOL care could help in HCPs’ interpersonal approach to patients as his concept harbors a holistic perception of the existential situation of a person. Equally, introducing Marcel’s phenomenology of hope into the clinical encounter could play a beneficial role in improving the ability of patients to adapt to the difficult conditions of their disease and PC treatment. (shrink)

Recently within the critical accounting literature Funnell (1998) has argued that accounting was implicated in the Holocaust. This charge is primarily related to the technical, mathematical nature of accounting and its ability to dehumanise individuals. Broadbent (1998, see also DeMoss and McCann, 1997) has also contended that "accounting logic" excludes emotion. She suggests that a more emancipatory form of accounting could be possible if emotion were given a voice and allowed to be heard within accounting discourse (see also Kjonstad and (...) Wilmott, 1995). This paper contends that emotion should be introduced into accounting education and in particular emotional commitment to other individuals should be encouraged. It is suggested that one way to do this may be through business ethics education. It is also suggested that increasing ethical commitment to other individuals may go some way towards combating the tendency for accountancy to dehumanise other people. While there have been specific studies of ethics and accounting education there has, as yet, been little open debate about what the objectives of accounting ethics education should be or the specific techniques that could be used to meet the desired aims. This paper contends that accountancy has become dangerously dehumanised and that one of the most important objectives for any business ethics education must be to develop an empathy with "the other". The paper studies the developments within the medical, legal and engineering profession in order to suggest some specific methods which could be employed in order to re-humanise accountancy and develop a sense of moral commitment towards other individuals. (shrink)

Clinical ethics consultation (CEC) has become all about right technique. When we encounter a case of conflict or confusion, clinical ethicists are expected to deploy a standardized, repeatable, and rationally defensible method for working toward a recommendation and/or consensus. While it has been noted previously that our techniques of CEC often foreclose on its internal goods, there remains an assumption that we must just find the _right_ efficient technique and the problem would be solved. In this paper, I question that (...) assumption, arguing that any standardized, identically repeatable model of CEC will pull us counterproductively away from ethical reflection, and toward the values of modern _techne_: primarily efficiency, efficacy, and repeatability. This is because standardized techniques of CEC pull the dynamism of being into what Catherine Pickstock calls “identical repetition,” a technologized ontology, which is fundamentally at odds with what being is. And, since ethics is a search for the good of being, avoiding the ontological heart of being severely restricts ethics. (shrink)

THIS PAPER COMPARES THE WORK OF MERLEAU-PONTY WITH THAT OF MARCEL, TO WHOM HE IS SAID TO OWE A MAJOR INTELLECTUAL DEBT. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE APPARENT SIMILARITIES TO BE FOUND IN THEIR WORK, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR CONCEPTS OF "INCARNATION" AND "SITUATION," THERE ARE STRIKING DIVERGENCES IN THEIR VIEWS ABOUT "HISTORY." A STUDY OF THESE POINTS THE WAY TO AN EXPLORATION OF YET MORE FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THEIR SUPERFICIALLY SIMILAR "PHILOSOPHIES OF EXISTENCE.".

The work of Gabriel Marcel is retrieved and set in relation to the question of moral epistemology. I begin by surveying Marcel’s long-running critique of a false dilemma with implications for the nature of our knowledge of values. According to this dilemma, a person’s knowledge of something is either objective, and therefore transcendent but impersonal, or it is subjective, and therefore personal but immanent, reaching only one’s inner states. Applied to the knowledge of values, this false dilemma leaves philosophy with (...) a choice between accounts of value-knowledge as scientific/objective knowledge or value-knowledge as self-knowledge. Building on Marcel’s critique of this false dilemma, I suggest a program for a Marcelian moral epistemology that identifies the comportments by which human person are receptive to values and hence to knowledge of values. Two examples of such comportment are discussed in relation to the problem of value-knowledge: exigence and fidelity. (shrink)