Most opposition to induced abortion turns on the belief that human fetuses are persons from conception. On this view, the moral status of the fetus alone requires those in a position to provide aid—gestational mothers—to make tremendous sacrifices to benefit the fetus. Recently, critics have argued that this pro-life position requires more than opposition to induced abortion. Pro-life theorists are relatively silent on the issues of spontaneous abortion, surplus in vitro fertilisation human embryos, and the suffering and death of born (...) persons due to lack of access to food, shelter and medical care. Colgrove et al call such arguments inconsistency arguments, arguing they ‘do not matter’ and mischaracterise them as ad hominem attacks. Here, I argue these are better understood as moral dilemmas. While some critics argue pro-life inaction is evidence that they do not really believe human fetuses are persons, I contend this inaction is likely the result of resolvable confusion rather than moral negligence. (shrink)

Emily Carroll and Parker Crutchfield propose a new inconsistency argument against abortion restrictivism. In response, I raised several objections to their argument. Recently Carroll and Crutchfield have replied and seem to be under the impression that I’m a restrictivist. This is puzzling, since my criticism of their view included a very thinly veiled, but purposely more charitable, anti-restrictivist inconsistency argument. In this response, I explain how Carroll and Crutchfield mischaracterize my position and that of the restrictivist.

The contemporary philosophical literature on abortion primarily revolves around three seemingly intractable debates, concerning the (1) moral status of the fetus, (2) scope of women’s rights and (3) moral relevance of the killing/letting die distinction. The possibility of ectogenesis—technology that would allow a fetus to develop outside of a gestational mother’s womb—presents a unique opportunity for moral compromise. Here, I argue those opposed to abortion have aprima faciemoral obligation to pursue ectogenesis technology and provide ectogenesis for disconnected fetuses as part (...) of a moral compromise. (shrink)

In 2008, many states sought to pass Human Life Amendments, which would extend the definition of personhood to encompass newly fertilized eggs. If such an amendment were to pass, Roe v. Wade, as currently defended by the Supreme Court, may be repealed. Consequently, it is necessary to defend the right to an abortion in a manner that succeeds even if a Human Life Amendment successfully passes. J.J. Thomson's argument in “A Defense of Abortion” successfully achieves this. Her argument is especially (...) strong when one considers that her central thesis—that one person's right to life does not entail the right to use another's person's body for continued sustenance—is pervasive in legal policies in the U.S.A. (shrink)

Jeremy Williams argues that both anti-abortion and pro-choice theories seem to justify two forms of anti-abortion violence – (1) violence against those that perform abortions, and (2) the subjugation of women seeking abortion. He illustrates this by way of his Death Camps analogy. However, Williams does not advocate such violence; rather he seems despondent over his conclusion. Here I argue Williams’ conclusion turns on confusion regarding the restrictivist position and a failure to adequately meet the challenge of Thomson’s Violinist case. (...) The Death Camps analogy is incomparable to the practice of abortion because it fails to capture the risks, burdens, and rights relationships present in pregnancy. (shrink)