The global Peter Lombard research reinaugurated in 1990s has resulted in a number of recent publications, but the Master of the Sentences’ theology proper is partially underresearched. In particular, a more detailed exposition of the distinctions 35-41 of his Book of Sentences is needed in order to clarify his doctrine of God’s knowledge and its relation to the human free will. The article builds on the earlier established evidence that, for Peter Lombard in distinctions 35-38, God’s knowledge, in general, is (...) not causative, although some causative power has to be ascribed to God’s knowledge of the good. The last part of distinction 38 and the content of distinction 39 further analyze the capacities and functionalities of the divine omniscience and explain how it interacts with acts of human will. The key question here deals with the problem of alternative states of affairs: whether something may be otherwise than God foreknew. As it is shown, Master Peter agrees that it is possible for created things and events to be otherwise than they are, but insists that God’s knowledge must be in any case exhaustive and infallible. He uses a number of logical tools to defend the thesis about God’s perfect knowledge and the possibility of things happening otherwise, but lacks a strict definition of the notion of “possibility” used here. The study concludes that in few cases Lombard’s posse could mean a potency or a simple logical possibility, or the diachronic contingency, but the overall theological statement is clear: potentially, God’s knowledge can be different or include alternative state of affairs but it cannot change. (shrink)

The late fourteenth-century English Carmelite Richard Lavenham was a prolific author of Latin and vernacular treatises on logic, physics, philosophy, and theology. Among other works pertaining to natural philosophy, he authored the short Tractatus terminorum naturalium, preserved in three complete or almost complete late fourteenth- or early fifteenth-century copies, with the opening passage preserved in three other manuscripts. The text is fundamentally a redaction of the Heytesburian Termini naturales, a brief glossary of technical vocabulary of the natural philosophy and physics (...) of the Oxford Calculators, supplemented by additional textual and pictorial material. As such, Lavenham’s treatise is a specific branch of an influential tradition of school texts that took the form of elementary treatises, additional glosses, quaestio-commentaries, and excerpts. (shrink)

The article treats the doctrine of transubstantiation or the Eucharistic change as formulated by Thomas Aquinas in his Summa theologiae, Question 75, against its double conceptual (Christian religious vs. Aristotelian philosophical), as well as double linguistic (Latin vs. translated Greek), background. The doctrine is presented and analyzed as a philosophical-theological theory that can be explicated and assessed using the concept of philosophical untranslatable(s), recently discovered and brought to the fore by the proponents of the “translational turn” in continental philosophy. It (...) is argued on the basis of careful study of Aquinas’ text that the notion of transubstantiation should be identified as a conceptual untranslatable. -/- Here the term “untranslatable” means a unique reinterpretation of Aristotelian language of being and change, which results in a conceptual innovation that has some inherent problems as well as creative and promising inventions. The usage of such a concept is justified by the fact that the reconceptualization that Aquinas did to a number of Peripatetic ideas creates a few untranslatable notions, which do not have much meaning outside the peculiarly Thomistic Latin vocabulary. Despite some criticisms they are not necessarily to be regarded as contradictions, but rather as thomistic untranslatables. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to discover, present and analyze the key ideas of Anselm of Canterbury concerning the notions of knowledge, will and mode of divine-human relations in the context of this “knowledge-will” framework which is important due to (a) somewhat insufficient attention to the medieval insights on the issue and (b) the peculiarity that Anselm’s intuitions have. More specifically, the object of the given paper is Anselmian understanding of relations between God’s foreknowledge and will, on the one (...) side, and human free will, on the other side, as it is presented in the work entitled De Concordia. In this treatise Anselm of Canterbury partially uses and further elaborates some ideas of Augustine and Boethius, while integrating, updating and synthesizing them in a creative manner, and partially develops a number of thoughts of his own. As a result, there is a set of the well-formulated and comprehensive theses concerning (i) different types of (metaphysical) necessity, (ii) a proper definition of freedom of choice and will, (iii) the nature of will per se, and, finally, (iv) unique relation of “simultaneity” that exists between God’s knowledge, God’s will and the creature’s rational will. These ideas are presented and explicated in the article along with detailed exposition and analytical examination of the main line of argumentation found in the De Concordia. (shrink)