Switch to: References

Citations of:

Offical apologies and the quest for historical justice

Toronto: Munk Centre for International Studies (2006)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Reasoning Like a State: Integration and the Limits of State Regret.Cindy Holder - 2014 - In Mihaela Mihai & Mathias Thaler (eds.), The Uses and Abuses of Apology. Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 203-219.
    Are there wrongs for which states cannot apologise? In this chapter, I argue that the answer is 'Yes'. I begin with the simple observation that reasoning as a state official requires a conception of what officials do, and so a conception of what is - and is not - properly undertaken on behalf of the state. To act as an official, then, requires a theory of what happens in a well functioning state: it requires a 'normative theory of the state. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Official apologies in the aftermath of political violence.Ernesto Verdeja - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (4):563-581.
    Abstract: This article examines the uses of official apologies for massive human rights abuses in the context of democratic transitions. It sketches a normative model of apologies, highlighting how they serve to provide some moral and practical redress for past wrongs. It discusses a number of contributions apologies can make, including publicly confirming the status of victims as moral agents, fostering public reexamination and deliberation about social norms, and promoting critical understandings of history that undermine apologist historical accounts. The article (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Just pretending: political apologies for historical injustice and vice’s tribute to virtue.Mathias Thaler - 2012 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 15 (3):259-278.
    Should we be concerned with, or alarmed or outraged by, the insincerity and hypocrisy of politicians who apologize for historical injustice? This paper argues that the correct reply to this question is: sometimes, but not always. In order to establish what types of insincerity must be avoided, Judith Shklar?s hierarchy of ordinary vices is critically revisited. Against Shklar?s overly benign account of hypocrisy, the paper then tries to demonstrate that only institutional and harmful forms of hypocrisy must be rejected in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations