This article is an attempt to clarify the idea that narratives cohere by representing stories. Stories are causally related in the way proposed by Noël Carroll, i.e., the events and states constitute necessary conditions or sufficient conditions or INUS-conditions of each other. Then, a general concept of propositional coherence is suggested. It is based on Nelson Goodman's and Joseph Ullian's ideas about unitary formulas. Narrative coherence is defined as the propositional understanding of a text (in the wide sense, including non-verbal (...) narratives) that constitutes one unitary string built upon conditional relations, i.e., relations between individuals matching Carroll's types of conditions. (shrink)

This article is an attempt to clarify the idea that narratives cohere by representing stories. Stories are causally related in the way proposed by Noël Carroll, i.e., the events and states constitute necessary conditions or sufficient conditions or INUS-conditions of each other. Then, a general concept of propositional coherence is suggested. It is based on Nelson Goodman's and Joseph Ullian's ideas about unitary formulas. Narrative coherence is defined as the propositional understanding of a text (in the wide sense, including non-verbal (...) narratives) that constitutes one unitary string built upon conditional relations, i.e., relations between individuals matching Carroll's types of conditions. (shrink)

In my dissertation I define historical disciplines as disciplines that aim to give a historical interpretation of the evidence. Phylogenetic systematics is a historical discipline and therefore in my definition phylogenies should be thought of as historical interpretations of relationships between taxa.

I propose a new argument showing that conscious vision sometimes depends constitutively on conscious attention. I criticise traditional arguments for this constitutive connection, on the basis that they fail adequately to dissociate evidence about visual consciousness from evidence about attention. On the same basis, I criticise Ned Block's recent counterargument that conscious vision is independent of one sort of attention (‘cognitive access'). Block appears to achieve the dissociation only because he underestimates the indeterminacy of visual consciousness. I then appeal to (...) empirical work on the interaction between visual indeterminacy and attention, to argue for the constitutive connection. (shrink)

To clarify and illuminate the place of probability in science Ellery Eells and James H. Fetzer have brought together some of the most distinguished philosophers ...

I explore the problem of ``probabilistic causal preemption'' in the context of a``propensity trajectory'' theory of singular probabilistic causation. This involvesa particular conception of events and a substantive thesis concerning events soconceived.