This article examines Wittgenstein’s criticism of Moore’s use of “know”, as he developed it in On Certainty. Arguing against much of the literature, the author claims that, by Wittgenstein’s own lights, Moore was not talking nonsense. He does so by showing, first, that the standard reading is based on the idea that hinge propositions are non-epistemic, and second, that Wittgenstein’s alleged adoption of the non-epistemic view is not adequately supported by the textual evidence. The author argues that claims to the (...) contrary depend on an undue conflation, on the part of interpreters, of Wittgenstein’s treatment of psychological avowals in Philosophical Investigations and his discussion of hinge propositions in On Certainty. Moreover, a closer look at Wittgenstein’s objections to Moore shows that Wittgenstein himself repeatedly charged Moore with a similar confusion between the status of psychological statements and the status of his common-sense truisms. (shrink)

Peters is best known for ‘Ethics and Education’, (1966) an attempt, using analytical methods, to provide a universal canonical account of the nature of education. This corresponded closely with the prevailing conception of liberal education of the time. Despite the acclaim with which this work was received, Peters became increasingly dissatisfied with his early views of education and in a series of papers written between 1973 and 1982, he retreated slowly from the view that one could construct a universal canonical (...) account of education and even from the view that this could be possible for liberal education. As his views changed, his philosophical methods developed as well, moving from the Moorean essentialist analysis of 1966, through a more Strawsonian connective analysis in the mid 1970s to a position based on W.B. Gallie's account of essentially contested concepts in the early 1980s. Parallel to and connected with this changing philosophical methodology came a distinction between an overarching concept of education and particular conceptions of education related to different societies and their values. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s conception of ‘persuasion’, understood as the persuader’s attempt to modify the persuadee’s certainties, has been recently misinterpreted by some scholars. For Persichetti has overlooked the fact that one cannot persuade unintentionally, while Marconi and Perissinotto have not only taken for granted that persuasion consists in the mere transfer of a world-picture or set of certainties to an individual even when she has not alternative or different certainties, but also that education is restricted to persuading or transmitting certainties. After clarifying (...) these misinterpretations, among others, I argue that persuasion is not used for teaching certainties at the outset, but for modifying them when they do not fit the ones expected by the persuader. If it is agreed that education partly consists in transmitting a world-picture, then persuasion constitutes a necessary resource for educators. Lastly, I provide a set of guidelines for teachers to draw attention to the basic aspects of persuasion that they should consider in the classroom. (shrink)

Literature on indoctrination has focused on imparting and revising beliefs, but it has hardly considered the way of teaching and acquiring certainties—in Wittgenstein’s sense. Therefore, the role played by rationality in the acquisition of our linguistic practices has been overestimated. Furthermore, analyses of the relationship between certainty and indoctrination contain major errors. In this paper, the clarification of the aforementioned issues leads me to suggest the avoidance of the term ‘indoctrination’ so as to avoid focusing on the suitability of the (...) case to the concept rather than on the analysis of the case itself. This should facilitate that the process of helping children to acquire a world-picture—by teaching them to ignore alternatives to certainties—is definitely accepted as normal and natural, for many beliefs are expected to end up becoming ungrounded certainties not only in the medium or long term, but also, and above all, in the short term. (shrink)