We investigate the general properties of general Bayesian learning, where “general Bayesian learning” means inferring a state from another that is regarded as evidence, and where the inference is conditionalizing the evidence using the conditional expectation determined by a reference probability measure representing the background subjective degrees of belief of a Bayesian Agent performing the inference. States are linear functionals that encode probability measures by assigning expectation values to random variables via integrating them with respect to the probability measure. If (...) a state can be learned from another this way, then it is said to be Bayes accessible from the evidence. It is shown that the Bayes accessibility relation is reflexive, antisymmetric and non-transitive. If every state is Bayes accessible from some other defined on the same set of random variables, then the set of states is called weakly Bayes connected. It is shown that the set of states is not weakly Bayes connected if the probability space is standard. The set of states is called weakly Bayes connectable if, given any state, the probability space can be extended in such a way that the given state becomes Bayes accessible from some other state in the extended space. It is shown that probability spaces are weakly Bayes connectable. Since conditioning using the theory of conditional expectations includes both Bayes’ rule and Jeffrey conditionalization as special cases, the results presented generalize substantially some results obtained earlier for Jeffrey conditionalization. (shrink)

The Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox is typically taken to highlight a tension between our intuition that certain conditional probabilities with respect to probability zero conditioning events are well defined and the mathematical definition of conditional probability by Bayes’ formula, which loses its meaning when the conditioning event has probability zero. We argue in this paper that the theory of conditional expectations is the proper mathematical device to conditionalize and that this theory allows conditionalization with respect to probability zero events. The conditional probabilities (...) on probability zero events in the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox also can be calculated using conditional expectations. The alleged clash arising from the fact that one obtains different values for the conditional probabilities on probability zero events depending on what conditional expectation one uses to calculate them is resolved by showing that the different conditional probabilities obtained using different conditional expectations cannot be interpreted as calculating in different parametrizations of the conditional probabilities of the same event with respect to the same conditioning conditions. We conclude that there is no clash between the correct intuition about what the conditional probabilities with respect to probability zero events are and the technically proper concept of conditionalization via conditional expectations—the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox is just a pseudo-paradox. (shrink)

The language of manuals may be used to discuss inference in measurement in a general experimental context. Specializing to the context of the frame manual for Hilbert space, this inference leads to state dominance of the inferred state from partial measurements; this in turn, by Sakai's theorem, determines observables which are described by positive operator-valued measures. Symmetries are then introduced, showing that systems of covariance, rather than systems of imprimitivity, are natural objects to study in quantum mechanics. Experiments measuring different (...) polarization components simultaneously are reexamined in this language. Finally, implications of the Naimark extension theorem for the manual approach are investigated. (shrink)

We analyze the quantum mechanical measuring process from the standpoint of information theory. Statistical inference is used in order to define the most likely state of the measured system that is compatible with the readings of the measuring instrument and the a priori information about the correlations between the system and the instrument. This approach has the advantage that no reference to the time evolution of the combined system need be made. It must, however, be emphasized that the result is (...) to be interpreted as the statistically inferred state of the original system rather than the state of the system after measurement. The phenomenon of “reduction of states” appears in this light as a consequence of incomplete information rather than the physical interaction between measured system and measuring instrument. (shrink)