This paper argues that formal models of coherence are useful for constructing a legal epistemology. Two main formal approaches to coherence are examined: coherence-based models of belief revision and the theory of coherence as constraint satisfaction. It is shown that these approaches shed light on central aspects of a coherentist legal epistemology, such as the concept of coherence, the dynamics of coherentist justification in law, and the mechanisms whereby coherence may be built in the course of legal decision-making.

This paper places formal learning theory in a broader philosophical context and provides a glimpse of what the philosophy of induction looks like from a learning-theoretic point of view. Formal learning theory is compared with other standard approaches to the philosophy of induction. Thereafter, we present some results and examples indicating its unique character and philosophical interest, with special attention to its unified perspective on inductive uncertainty and uncomputability.

Communication between natural or artificial agents relies on the use of a common vocabulary. Since sharing terms does not necessarily imply that the terms have exactly the same meanings for all agents, integrating statements into a formal ontology requires mechanisms for resolving conflicts that are caused by the ambiguity of terms specified in different but similar ontologies.We define and analyze a family of ontology-revision operators that resolve conflicts by disambiguating concept symbols occurring in both the ontology and the trigger statements. (...) The operators yield bridging axioms relating the different readings of the terms and, by including representations for both readings, preserve the initial ontology as well as the trigger statements. The operators differ regarding which reading of the ambiguous term is assigned to further uses of the common term and regarding the semantic relation assumed between the two readings. The ontology-revision operators are analyzed regarding their adaptability to consistent sequences of trigger statements. One group of operators preserves all conflicts with the trigger sequence. Operators from the other group can resolve the conflicts, which is demonstrated by showing under which conditions weak type-2 operators yield stabilizing sequences of ontologies. Stronger type-2 operators can result in closer approximations of the terminology underlying the sequence of trigger statements but can also yield non-stabilizing sequences of ontologies. (shrink)