Philosophers traditionally interpret Kant as a retributivist, but modern interpreters, with reference to Kant’s theory of justice and problematic passages, instead propose penal theories that mix retributive and deterrent features. Although these mixed penal theories are substantively compelling and capture the Kantian spirit, their dual aspects lead to a justificatory conflict that generates an apparent dilemma. To resolve this dilemma and clear the ground for these mixed theories, I will outline and reinterpret Kant’s penal theory by situating it in his (...) broader moral and political philosophy. This move grounds the followability requirement, which is necessary to resolve the dilemma. (shrink)

This essay argues that Kant’s conception of regulative ideas of practical reason introduced in the Critique of Pure Reason serves an important twofold function in his political philosophy. First, Kant’s version of the ideal, Platonic republic acts as the a priori paradigm of a rightful state to which existing regimes can and should conform. Second, Kant frames the regulative status of such practical ideas as a resolution of the conflict between the extremes of dogmatism and skepticism. In his principal political (...) writings from the 1790s—i. e., “Theory and Practice,” “Perpetual Peace,” and the Doctrine of Right—Kant draws on his account of practical ideas in the Critique to articulate a counterfactual norm of popular sovereignty that distinguishes his political standpoint from opponents on the left and the right. Radicals repeat the error of the dogmatists by affirming that the norm of collective self-legislation is completely attainable in experience. By contrast, conservatives make the mistake of the skeptics by denying that rational political standards can be applied to reality at all. I show that Kant reconciles these extremes through his model of gradual, non-violent political reform guided by the regulative ideal of a perfectly self-legislating state. (shrink)