This article reconstructs Abelard’s account of eternal truths as it is presented in the Dialectica, in the so-called Sententiae Parisienses, and in the Theologia “Scholarium.” It first shows how in the Dialectica Abelard had to transform the traditional account of topical inferences in order to make sense of the idea that true conditional propositions express eternal truths. It clarifies Abelard’s claim that eternal truths are grounded on the “nature of things” and explains why Abelard thought that these truths hold even (...) when there are no things. The article then considers Abelard’s reply to an objection according to which eternal truths have in fact been false in the past. It examines Abelard’s mature views on eternal truths as we find them in the Sententiae Parisienses and Theologia “Scholarium.” Here, Abelard grants the status of eternal truth also to what is expressed by contingently true categorical propositions. These truths are grounded on the “events of things” that exist eternally as the proposition-like objects of God’s will and foreknowledge. (shrink)

Le glissement de l’attention du langage parlé vers le langage intérieur dans la philosophie médiévale est bien connu. Ce qui n’a jamais été remarqué est le rôle joué par la reconnaissance des paradoxes et problèmes de signification posés par les caractéristiques physiques du langage parlé. Cet essai examine ces paradoxes et les solutions apportées dans les écrits de Pierre Abélard, de ses contemporains, et de quelques auteurs du début du xiii e siècle.

The philosophical output of Héloïse d’Argenteuil. This article attempts to deconstruct the overhyped erotic relationship between the philosopher-monk Peter Abelard and philosopher-nun Héloïse d’Argenteuil, by surveying Héloïse’s extant texts as such, isolating three themes in her philosophical output: her concept of Cicerian love, her criticism of marriage and her notion of moral and material responsibility, which includes her understanding of an ethics of attitude and intention. When Héloïse is read against the grain of the standardised Abelard-reception, she is brought into (...) perspective as an independent thinker, who deserves more intellectual respect than to be caricaturised as either Abelard’s secret young lover, or his unwilling wife. When her texts are read as independent outputs, albeit often in the form of correspondence, she steps forward as the ‘first female philosopher of the Middle Ages’. Her relationship with Abelard, important as it was for both of them, is secondary to her standing as a philosopher proper. (shrink)