I demonstrate that analogies, both explicit and implicit, between Wittgenstein’s discussions of rituals, aesthetics, and aspect-perception, have important payoffs in terms of understanding his notion of a “surveyable representation” (übersichtliche Darstellung) as it applies to phenomena that are not exclusively grammatical in nature. In particular, I argue that a surveyable representation of certain anthropological and aesthetic facts allows us to see, qua form of aspect-perception, internal relations and formal connections, so that the inner nature of a ritual or the solution (...) of an aesthetic puzzle is exhibited. This particular form of seeing both explains why Wittgenstein thought that hypothetical explanations about the origins of a ritual are irrelevant to appreciating its meaning and elucidates his understanding of rituals, which involves seeing “internal relations” and “formal connections.” The upshots of the account for work in anthropology are discussed. (shrink)

I demonstrate that analogies, both explicit and implicit, between Wittgenstein’s discussion of rituals, aesthetics, and psychoanalysis (and, indeed, his own philosophical methodology) suggest that he entertained the idea that Freud’s psychoanalytic project, when understood correctly—that is, as a descriptive project rather than an explanatory-hypothetical one—provides a “surveyable representation” (übersichtliche Darstellung) of certain psychological facts (as opposed to psychological concepts). The consequences of this account are that it offers an explanation of Wittgenstein’s admiration for and self-perceived affinity to Freud, as well (...) as of his apparent “know-nothing approach” to empirical psychology. (shrink)

The questions of how we can understand others and how we can know what they feel, think and sense have repeatedly preoccupied Wittgenstein since the 1930s and especially in his last writings. In this article, the author will tackle these questions by focusing on the other as other or strange. For it is also the strangeness of others, their otherness as such, that makes it difficult and even impossible to recognize and understand their inner life. As she will show, such (...) otherness can be made comprehensible by fictional narratives, in which aspects of others’ lives are related to what is one’s own, i.e., our own inner experience, such that we can find ourselves in them. Moreover, she will argue that this idea of making something comprehensible through fictional narratives has a special methodological relevance for Wittgenstein when it comes to understanding what is ‘one’s own’ in the broadest sense. (shrink)