This article examines how experimental psychology experienced a revolution as cognitive science replaced behaviorism in the mid-20th century. This transition in the scientific account of human nature involved making normal what had once been normative: borrowing ideas of democratic thinking from political culture and conceptions of good thinking from philosophy of science to describe humans as active, creatively thinking beings, rather than as organisms that simply respond to environmental conditions. Reflexive social and intellectual practices were central to this process as (...) cognitive scientists used anti-positivist philosophy of science simultaneously to justify their own work as valid and also as a model of human thinking. In the process, the normative philosophy of science or ‘good academic thinking’ that cognitive scientists used to reshape the discipline of psychology and characterize themselves became, at the same time, the descriptive model of human nature. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Maslow has suggested that we turn from means-centering to problem-centering in science. In two other papers the present author offered a theoretical foundation which would make Maslow's suggestions psychologically sound. For as he suggests, it is only by centering ourselves towards the task that the task is accomplished or towards the problem that the problem is solved. This does not mean that methods or means, or, in the broader sense, of means as ends or of ends (...) per se, do not constitute problems. The whole problem of psychology is the means by which the organism obtains knowledge; the problem of education is that of means, or the problem of communication is one of means, or of any profession, e.g., engineering or medicine, the problem may be of means as a problem. Whichever is the case it is only so far as problems are solved that we are free to go on to tackle new ones or throw light on the more basic ones and thus enrich our lives. Problem solving, of course, does not mean that particular problems as framed are solvable. For example, if the rules state that one must connect each dot with every other dot on a piece of paper with lines that do not intersect, a four dot problem is solvable but a five dot situation cannot be resolved within these rules. In the latter case it may mean that the problem becomes: “can anyone solve it?” This has been the lesson of the mathematicians and the logical positivists. But what is problem solving? (shrink)

In this paper, I contend that the narrative presented in Husserl’s recently translated Text 7 is a strikingly clear affirmation and vindication of the psychological adaptation of phenomenology developed by Amedeo Giorgi. I argue that Giorgi’s methodological advocacy of the epoché makes good sense when considered in the context of the history of humanistic psychology. A review of Carl Rogers’s and Abraham Maslow’s attempts to revision psychology shows that they each, in their own way, argued for a turn away from (...) all-out objectivism in research, toward what phenomenologists would refer to as the being-in-the-world-with-others that permeates the relationship between researcher and research participants. But neither could envision or develop a methodological procedure for the researcher to simultaneously suspend their habitual way of making judgements and forming conclusions in that relationship. Instead, they advocated for the extension of a humanized therapeutic clinical presence of openness, acceptance, and affirmation in psychological research. Thus, a Husserlian approach to phenomenological psychology was not only a desirable addition to humanistic thought, it was sorely needed for humanistic psychology to fulfill its research promise. Giorgi, more than any other thinker of his time, provided this addition. It is further argued that Giorgi’s contribution remains highly relevant, though underappreciated. (shrink)

The terms “paradigm” and “paradigm shift” originated in “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” by Thomas Kuhn. A paradigm can be defined as the generally accepted concepts and practices of a field, and a paradigm shift its replacement in a scientific revolution. A paradigm shift results from a crisis caused by anomalies in a paradigm that reduce its usefulness to a field. Claims of paradigm shifts and revolutions are made frequently in the neurosciences. In this article I will consider neuroscience paradigms, (...) and the claim that new tools and techniques rather than crises have driven paradigm shifts. I will argue that tool development has played a minor role in neuroscience revolutions. (shrink)