More than twenty years after its original publication, _The Case for Animal Rights _is an acknowledged classic of moral philosophy, and its author is recognized as the intellectual leader of the animal rights movement. In a new and fully considered preface, Regan responds to his critics and defends the book's revolutionary position.

The ordinary attribution of intentionality to (nonhuman) animals raises serious problems for fashionable linguistic accounts of belief and of intentionality generally; and many of the alleged problems arise from such linguistic theories of mind. Another deeper source of alleged problems is the apartness thesis, that there is a significant difference in kind, with substantial moral import, between humans and other animals; for the last lines of defence of this erroneous thesis consist in making out that there are significant intentional differences. (...) A wide range of recent arguments against assigning intentionality (in the full sense) to animals are criticized in detail: those of Stich and Williams, in terms of animals lacking effective or specifiable concepts (concepts now replacing souls); those of Stich and Davidson based on the requirement for beliefs of an isomorphic belief network; those based on the usual opacity of intentionality; those of Descartes and Davidson and others based on the requirement of, or arguments to the essentiality of, language use for attributions of intentionality; arguments based on the requirement of capacity for pretence or awareness of error; and arguments used by Vendler and Malcolm. Several different arguments for assigning intentionality to animals are then advanced, arguments from cerebral organization, exteriorization arguments, and interiorization arguments from the semantical analysis of intentionality. The main arguments advanced are not analogical; they are not anthropocentric, or the result of personifying languageless animals; and the attributions of intentionality they lead to are not impoverished or of reduced status. (shrink)

Abstract Is it plausible to claim (some) non?human animals have beliefs, on the (non?behaviourist) assumption that believing is or involves subjects? engaging in practical reasoning which takes account of meanings? Some answer Yes, on the ground that evolutionary continuities linking humans with other animals must include psychological ones. But (1) evolution does not operate?even primarily?by means of continuities. Thus species, no matter how closely related (in fact, sometimes even conspecifics) operate with very different adaptive ?tricks'; and it is plausible to (...) think these, rather than the physiological ?groundings? underlying them, are the best means of (analogies for) explaining beliefs. Also (2) it is reasonable to assimilate most cases ?down? to creatures (e.g. flies) that obviously lack beliefs rather than ?up? to others (chimpanzees) that apparently possess belief?like states (proto?beliefs), because observation shows the internal workings of such middle animals? ?beliefs? differ markedly from the corresponding things humans do. For example, ducks do not have beliefs about the numbers of objects, because although they estimate numerically, they do it in a way that is much more firmly connected to perceiving than would be the case either with counting or a counting?like process. (shrink)

The question of our place in nature has long been with us. One answer lies in comparing humans with other animals , thereby highlighting the uniquely human. To this end, I examine the distinction between humans and brutes as delineated by Descartes, Kant, and the Chicago pragmatist George Mead. This selection not merely assures a wide-spectrum of opinion still alive today, it marks a general historical shift from the metaphysical dualism of Descartes' mechanical world and spiritual self, to the epistemic (...) dualism of Kant and his double sense of self, finally to Mead's naturalistic monism, in which consciousness emerges naturally from the non-conscious. Apart from illuminating issues current in the animal-rights literature, examining this single topic casts a new light on these figures, especially Kant and Mead . Descartes' dualism is understandable simply given his scientific commitments, and the chasm he found in the human/brute gap was as much a result of this scientific motivation as any religious or moral one. For Kant, brutes lack the power to judge, understand, or reason. But more importantly, they lack autonomy and are therefore without moral worth. The unbridgeable chasm, metaphysical for Descartes, became for Kant primarily moral. Brutes do have representations and desires, however, and, by virtue of being alive, an immaterial principle; Kant consequently rejected Descartes' animal-machine hypothesis. Darwin's account of the human/brute gap and Mead's Darwinistic psychology are discussed. Selfhood and consciousness are unique to humans, although brutes are conscious in another sense. Mead's different uses of 'consciousness' are separated in order to clarify this difference as well as the role of language in the emergence of mind. Mead argued that humans perceive social objects prior to physical objects while brutes perceive none of these, lacking the capacities of universalization and object-manipulation. Like Descartes and Kant, Mead minimized brute experience, thereby maintaining a wide gulf between humans and brutes despite his Darwinian naturalism. (shrink)

I attempt a reasoned, qualified defence of zoos, but in full recognition of the moral challenge to them. This challenge is mainly examined in chapters 3 to 7. Animals are indeed free in the wild, and must lose that freedom in some degree in zoos *. However animal captivity need only share with human captivity its being brought about by an external agent, it can and should be captivity in a technical sense only, and at its best can clearly be (...) morally acceptable. But there appear to be in all essential respects differences only of degree between animals and humans and no reason therefore why their moral claims upon us should be any different in principle from humans' claims. As, in addition, there appears to be a dominating tendency in human nature which, though no doubt useful or even essential in itself, also on occasion allows us to be oblivious to our own cruelty to other humans or animals or, worse, actively to enjoy such cruelty, bad captivity is a real possibility which needs to be vigorously guarded against. A comparison of the respective advantages for an animal of free and captive life shows that captivity can have the advantages of longer, more comfortable life with medical attention, but the likely drawback of an absence of the normal problems of living, especially food-seeking, in which animals, adapted to their natural ways of life by selection through millions of years, are likely to find satisfaction. However the state of domestication is not normally regarded as morally objectionable, and animals in zoos are in fact slightly domesticated. Interestingly, domesticated animals also retain far more of their natural behaviour than is normally appreciated. Certain criteria, such as health, breeding, and occurrence of natural behaviour, enable us both to assess the wellbeing or otherwise of captive animals kept in different ways, and to improve the quality of animal-keeping, as well as providing us with a means of articulating specifically and scientifically which ways of keeping certain animals are morally wrong, and which animals, if any, should not be kept at all. Study of an animal's natural behaviour and way of life is here of fundamental importance, as it also is in assessing the moral acceptability of ways of keeping domesticated animals. Certain animals in zoos and ways of keeping them are considered in the light of the criteria, and it is suggested that there are clear indications in some cases of animals' wellbeing in captivity. There are also undoubted failings in much zookeeping, and it is emphasised that keeping animals should be a continuing process of search for improvements. While traditional expertise is of great value, the importance also of being open to and endeavouring to make the fullest use of new ethological and other scientific knowledge cannot be over-emphasised. The major justification for keeping any animals captive must be a demonstration of their wellbeing on the lines above, but there are powerful supplementary justifications which I examine in chapters 11 to 16. I see wildlife conservation as part of a moral attitude of responsibility towards anything which may reasonably be regarded as of value. Valuing itself I see as a fundamental moral concept, and stewardship, which term I use without any implied religious connotations, as necessarily avoiding any narrowly selfish or purely financial motivation in, especially, management of the natural world. Animals themselves have exceptional and remarkable claims for being conserved, aesthetic as well as scientific. Respect for their own lives as individuals should also be a motive for their conservation. While conservation in the wild must be our primary concern, zoos have a considerable supplementary conservation role to play. This role, if zoos can only grasp it responsibly as they should, will transform them from being the independent wildlife consumers of past history into cooperating guardians of centrally managed captive populations of endangered and other species, whose genetic variation will be safeguarded with a view to future reintroductions if and when necessary. Zoos' scientific and educational roles also have strong conservational connections. Zoos may also assist the protection of natural areas by satisfying much of humans' urge for wildlife contact: zoos are visited by millions of people who could never, in comparable numbers, visit "the wild" without irreparably damaging it. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that Regan’s subjects-of-a-life account is epistemically irresponsible. Firstly, in making so many epistemic claims. Secondly in making the claims themselves.